Legal Issues Surrounding Veto Use and Aggression

Jennifer Trahan

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LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING VETO USE AND AGGRESSION

Jennifer Trahan*

Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................... 93
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 94
II. AGGRESSION AND JUS COGENS ....................................... 100
   A. Jus Cogens—the Highest Level of International Law ...... 100
   B. The Prohibition of Aggression as Jus Cogens ............... 102
   C. The Content of the Peremptory Norm ......................... 104
   D. The Obligation to Respect Jus Cogens Carries Over to the
      Security Council ....................................................... 107
   E. The Obligation to Respect Jus Cogens also Carries over to
      the Permanent Members .............................................. 111
   F. A Security Council Resolution in Conflict with Jus Cogens
      Would Be Void ........................................................... 115
   G. Application to Russia’s Veto ........................................ 117
   H. Russia’s Veto Is at Odds with the Obligations Reflected in
      the ILC’s Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally
      Wrongful Acts ........................................................... 119
III. AGGRESSION AND THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
      UNITED NATIONS ...................................................... 122
   A. The Security Council’s Powers Are Limited by the UN
      Charter, Including the Requirement of Acting in Accordance
      with the UN’s Purposes and Principles .......................... 123
   B. The Permanent Members’ Powers Are Limited by the UN
      Charter, Including the Requirement of Acting in Accordance
      with the UN’s Purposes and Principles .......................... 127
   C. The UN’s Purposes and Principles ............................... 128
   D. The Obligation to Adhere to the UN’s Purposes and
      Principles Pertains to Veto Use ................................. 129
   E. Application of the UN’s Purposes and Principles to Russia’s
      Veto ........................................................................ 135
   F. Operationalizing These Legal Obligations ...................... 140

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93
I. INTRODUCTION

On February 24, 2022, in the largest mobilization of troops in Europe since World War II, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of the neighboring state of Ukraine. Russia claimed to be demilitarizing and de-Nazifying Ukraine, protecting the people against genocide, and acting in self-defense. The International Court of Justice has since provisionally ruled “that Ukraine has a plausible right not to be subjected to military operations by the Russian Federation for the purpose of preventing and punishing an alleged genocide in the territory of Ukraine” and issued a provisional measures order for Russia to “immediately suspend the military operations . . . .” Russia’s intervention—which arguably began in 2014 with the attempted annexation of Crimea and installation of Russian separatist-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine—appears, on its face, to constitute a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Indeed, in a resolution co-sponsored by ninety-four UN Member States, the UN General Assembly “[d]eplore[d] in the strongest terms the aggression by

4. H.R. Res. 1038, 117th Cong. (2022) (“Since 2014, President Vladimir Putin has violated the sovereignty of Ukraine and used military force to seize control and unlawfully occupy Crimea and installed Russian separatist-backed forces in eastern Ukraine . . . .”).
5. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
the Russian Federation against Ukraine [which it declared to be] in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter.\textsuperscript{6}

Yet, despite the UN Charter violation—or at least apparent Charter violation\textsuperscript{7}—the Russian Federation, using its veto power under Article 27(3), was able, on February 25, 2022, to block condemnation of its own aggression before the UN Security Council\textsuperscript{8}—the body charged under the UN Charter with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”\textsuperscript{9} Moreover, because of Russia’s veto power, it is unlikely that the Security Council will play any significant role related to the situation in Ukraine—in implementing a sanctions regime, taking measures to try to stop or end the commission of atrocity crimes,\textsuperscript{10} referring the situation to the International Criminal Court (which referral could include the crime of aggression),\textsuperscript{11} or

\begin{itemize}
  \item[7.] See infra text accompanying notes 33–35.
  \item[8.] S.C. Res. S/2022/155 (Feb. 25, 2022) \textit{vetoed} by the Russ. (draft resolution).
  \item[9.] U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1.
  \item[10.] “Atrocity crimes” herein means genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes. The crime of aggression also results in atrocities and there are other horrific crimes that could equally be termed “atrocity crimes.” See Scott Straus, \textit{Fundamentals of Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention} 35 (2016).
\end{itemize}
taking other measures to try to resolve the situation.12 Thus, the Security Council will be largely paralyzed from carrying out its core mandate because of the veto power of a permanent member.13 This is similar to the paralysis that resulted when the Security Council was repeatedly unable to act due to vetoes or veto threats with respect to the crimes occurring in Syria,14 in Darfur, Sudan,15 and numerous other situations.16

All of this begs the question of whether international law has anything to say about this. Can a permanent member of the Security Council, violating the core norm against the aggressive use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter),17 by using a single provision of the Charter (Article 27(3)),18 block its own condemnation? Specifically, why should the veto, provided for in one provision of the Charter, Article 27(3),19 be considered

12. The Security Council has many “tools” at its disposal, running the gamut under Chapter VII from provisional measures to non-forceful measures, to forceful measures. See U.N. Charter arts. 40–42.

13. Admittedly, even if the Security Council were able to function related to the situation in Ukraine, some options that the Council normally has at its disposal such as Chapter VII forceful intervention would be off the table because Russia is a nuclear power. Yet, there are other measures the Council has at its disposal.

14. More than 17 Security Council resolutions were vetoed, including those trying to prevent atrocity crimes, such as use of chemical weapons. For a discussion of the war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring in Syria, and each of Russia’s and sometimes China’s accompanying vetoes, see JENNIFER TRAHAN, EXISTING LEGAL LIMITS TO SECURITY COUNCIL VETO POWER IN THE FACE OF ATROCITY CRIMES 262–302 (2020).

15. For discussion of the genocide occurring in Darfur, Sudan, and each of China’s veto threats that watered down the sanctions regime, and weakened the peacekeeping mandate and delayed the UN’s eventual hybrid peacekeeping deployment, see id. at 302–42.

16. For discussion of other vetoes and veto threats in the face of atrocity crimes, see id. at 33–47. The author applies her arguments to all veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, regardless of which permanent member is casting the veto.


18. Id. art. 27, ¶ 3.

19. The word “veto” is not found in Article 27(3), which states that a resolution requires the affirmative vote of the permanent members
“above” the core norm obligations in article 2(4)\textsuperscript{20}—not to mention other parts of the Charter and the requirements of international law, including respect for \textit{jus cogens}? Is it logical that a permanent member still be allowed to reap all the benefits of permanent membership, even when violating the UN Charter, violating the “Purposes and Principles” of the UN,\textsuperscript{21} violating international law, and causing the Security Council to be unable to carry out its core mandate? Is this not an “abuse of right”\textsuperscript{22}—and the accompanying responsibility—that comes with veto power?\textsuperscript{23} This article explores these tensions.

In my book, \textit{Existing Legal Limits to Security Council Veto Power in the Face of Atrocity Crimes},\textsuperscript{24} I argue that there are certain in-built limitations to veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—i.e., “atrocity crimes.”\textsuperscript{25} Namely, the veto should not be used in a way that: (1) is inconsistent with, or facilitates violations of, \textit{jus cogens}; (2) is contrary to the UN’s Purposes and Principles; or (3) is inconsistent with treaty obligations, such as those found in the Genocide Convention\textsuperscript{26} and 1949 Geneva Conventions.\textsuperscript{27}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. art. 2, ¶ 4.
\item Id. arts. 1–2.
\item See U.N. Charter art. 27.
\item Trahan, \textit{supra} note 14.
\item See \textit{id}. at 2. The crime of aggression, however, might also be considered an “atrocity crime,” and most certainly is a “core crime” under the ICC’s Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, \textit{supra} note 11, art. 5, ¶ 1.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Basically, my thesis is as follows: one would not expect the Security Council to endorse the commission of genocide in a resolution—indeed, the resulting resolution would likely be void;\(^{28}\) thus, if there is ongoing genocide, and a plan to try to stop it is vetoed, why is that considered permissible, when the result is to sanction the continued perpetration of genocide? If the Security Council is unable to endorse genocide through its resolutions,\(^ {29}\) why is an individual permanent member permitted to do so through veto use? That, I argue, is an untenable reading of the UN Charter and obligations of international law as they have evolved over time, i.e., as they presently exist.\(^ {30}\) I make essentially the same arguments about vetoes cast in the face of crimes against humanity and war crimes, where the vetoing permanent member is essentially giving a green light to, and thereby helping to enable, the continuing perpetration of those crimes.\(^ {31}\)


29. Id.

30. Now, there is significantly more law related to the crime of genocide, for example, than in 1945. It is against such an up-to-date reading of international law that one should measure the actions of states today. See Christian Henderson, The UK Government’s Legal Opinion on Forcible Measures in Response to the Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Government, 64 INT’L L. & COMPAR. L. Q. 179, 185 (2015) (“the meaning of even fundamental provisions [of the UN Charter] [does] not necessarily remain static”); RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, ESSENTIALS: INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 92 (2009) (“It is generally accepted at the international level that treaties are to be treated as living documents. In other words, they are to be interpreted in the context of the time in which they are being applied, and not as they would have been interpreted at the time of their drafting.”); Arman Sarvarian, Humanitarian Intervention after Syria, 36 LEGAL STUD. 20, 24–25 (2016) (quoting Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 926, 929 (2000) (international law “is not static but develops through a process of State practice of actions and the reaction to those actions”)).

31. As to crimes against humanity, because there is not (yet) a freestanding treaty, the third treaty-based argument does not apply. See Trahan, supra note 14, at 247.
This article examines the extent to which the first two arguments—about veto use that (1) is inconsistent with, or facilitates violations of, *jus cogens*, or (2) is contrary to the UN’s Purposes and Principles—apply when there is ongoing aggression, i.e., use of force contrary to the UN Charter. The article does not examine the third level of obligation—aggression measured against treaty obligations—as, here, the treaty being breached by aggressive use of force is the UN Charter. Thus, the author’s second argument (based on the UN Charter), and the third argument (based on treaty obligations) merge regarding aggression.

The article takes as a starting assumption that Russia has, at least in its 2022 invasion, if not already in 2014, committed an act of aggression or use of force that appears to violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter—i.e., a *prima facie* case exists. Of course, if there were to be litigation over state responsibility or a criminal case for the crime of aggression, the legality or illegality of Russia’s actions—and those of individual civilian and military

32. *See supra* note 4 and accompanying text (regarding Russia’s prior invasion of Crimea).

33. Both Ukraine and Russia have the crime of aggression (an older version of the definition) in their criminal codes. *See* Criminal Code of Ukraine, ch. 20, art. 437 (2001); Ugołownyĭ Kodeks Rossiiĭskoĭ Federatsii [UK RF] [Criminal Code], art. 353 (Russ.). The ICC lacks jurisdiction over the crime of aggression related to Russian nationals and crimes committed on Russian territory, as Russia is not a State Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute. *See* Rome Statute, *supra* note 11, art. 15bis, ¶ 5 (there is no ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression committed by nationals, or crimes committed on the territory, of a non-State Party). The same is true of Belarus (which permitted its territory to be used to launch the invasion), and actually, Ukraine is not a party to the Rome Statute either. *See infra* note 178 (Belarus); *see also* Ukraine, *supra* note 11. Various efforts are currently ongoing to create an ad hoc Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression. *See*, e.g., Representatives of Latvia, Liechtenstein and Ukraine to the U.N., Letter dated Aug. 12, 2022 from the Representatives of Latvia, Liechtenstein and Ukraine to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ES-11/7-S/2022/616 (Aug. 17, 2022); *see also* Blog Series: *The Case for Creating an International Tribunal to Prosecute the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine*, JUST SEC., www.justsecurity.org/tag/u-n-general-assembly-and-international-criminal-tribunal-for-aggression-against-ukraine/.
leaders responsible for them\textsuperscript{34}—would need to be adjudicated.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, the author claims only that Russia’s actions appear to violate \emph{jus cogens} and appear to violate the UN Charter.

**II. AGGRESSION AND JUS COGENS**

This first section explores the tension between veto use and a violation of a peremptory norm of international law protected at the level of \emph{jus cogens}. Specifically, it examines veto use that appears to further or assist a \emph{jus cogens} violation—i.e., violation of a peremptory norm of international law—by allowing continuation of the status quo where the \emph{jus cogens} violation is occurring. This analysis is applied to Russia’s veto in the face of its own apparent violation of a peremptory norm of international law, the prohibition of aggression, committed\textsuperscript{36} through its invasion of Ukraine.

A. \textit{Jus Cogens—the Highest Level of International Law}

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,\textsuperscript{37} “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{34} The crime of aggression applies to persons “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 8\textsuperscript{bis}, ¶ 1.

\textsuperscript{35} The determination of an act of aggression by an outside body—such as the General Assembly or Security Council—would not bind the ICC, which would have to make its own determination whether an act of aggression occurred. This should be true in other fora as well—whether there was an act of aggression would be part of the case and need to be proven. Id. arts. 15\textsuperscript{bis}, ¶ 9; 15\textsuperscript{ter}, ¶ 4.

\textsuperscript{36} See caveat supra text accompanying notes 33–35.


\textsuperscript{38} Id. art. 53. A \emph{jus cogens} norm has been described as one that: “(1) [h]as the status of a norm of general international law; (2) [i]t is accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole; (3) [c]annot be derogated from; and (4) [c]an only be modified by a new norm of the same status.” \textsc{Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law} § 102(k) (Am. Law Inst. 1987). But see James A. Green, \textit{Questioning the Peremptory Status
Fitzmaurice, the Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the Law of Treaties,\(^3\) explains *jus cogens* as follows: “There are certain forms of illegal action that can never be justified . . . . These are acts which are not merely illegal, but *malum in se*, [namely] rules in the nature of *jus cogens*—that is to say obligations of an absolute character, compliance with which is not dependent on corresponding compliance by others, but is requisite in all circumstances . . . .”\(^4\) Professor Alfred Verdross, a member of the ILC writing in 1966,\(^5\) articulated the concept this way:

[In the field of general international law there are rules having the character of *jus cogens*. The criterion for these rules consists in the fact that they do not exist to satisfy the needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole international community. Hence these rules are absolute.\(^6\)]

The hierarchical nature of international law, with *jus cogens* or peremptory norms at the apex, is explained as follows:

Peremptory norms of international law or norms of *jus cogens* have a superior hierarchy in relation to other rules. This classification is reflected in the text of Article 53 of the [VCLT] . . . , according to which a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law.\(^7\)

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42. Whiteman, supra note 40, at 612 (quoting Verdross, supra note 41, at 58).
“Rules contrary to the notion of *jus cogens* could be regarded as void, since those rules oppose the fundamental norms of international public policy.”

B. *The Prohibition of Aggression as Jus Cogens*

Just as, for example, the prohibitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of basic rules of international humanitarian law, slavery, and torture are protected at this highest level of international law, so too is the prohibition of aggression. Thus, the ILC specifically identifies “the prohibition...
of aggression” in its non-exhaustive list of peremptory norms of general international law—*jus cogens*.\(^\text{47}\)

In its Commentary, the ILC provides the following details:

The first norm identified . . . is the prohibition of aggression. The prohibition of aggression was referred to by the [ILC] in the commentary to the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. In 1966, the [ILC] stated that the “law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of *jus cogens*” . . . . Like the commentary to the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, the conclusions of the Study Group on fragmentation of international law referred to the prohibition of aggression as a peremptory norm. The report of the Study Group on fragmentation of international law, after referring to the [ILC’s] identification of the prohibition of aggression, included “the prohibition of aggressive use of force” on its list of the “most frequently cited candidates for the status of *jus cogens*.”\(^\text{48}\)

One scholar further explains the existence of the *jus cogens* norm:

The prohibition on the use of force was also recognised as *jus cogens* at the 1969 Vienna Conference, when it was the most frequently cited example of a norm of *jus cogens*. Discussions leading to the adoption of the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, also demonstrated agreement among States as to the *jus cogens* nature of a norm in the *jus ad bellum*.\(^\text{49}\)

The importance of the norm cannot be understated. Louis Henkin described the prohibition against aggressive use of force

\(^{47}\) The right of self-determination.

\(^{48}\) *Id.*

\(^{49}\) Katie A. Johnston, *Identifying the Jus Cogens Norm in the Jus ad Bellum*, 70 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 29, 42 (2021) (citations omitted); for the declaration, see G.A. Res. 42/22, at 287 (Nov. 18, 1987).
as “the principal norm of international law of [the twentieth] century.”

C. The Content of the Peremptory Norm

As to the content of the peremptory norm, while there have been some variations in how the norm is formulated, it is generally understood as the use of force contrary to the UN Charter—i.e., a violation of Article 2(4), which excludes use of force that falls within Article 51 self-defense or Chapter VII authorized Security Council intervention.

The ILC takes this view, stating: “the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.” In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ also recognized that the ILC had “expressed the view that ‘the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens,’” a position neither of the

51. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 58–60.
52. See U.N. Charter art. 51; although Green does not adopt this position, he suggests the norm might be formulated as: “[t]he use of armed force directed against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or which is in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N. is prohibited other than when it is employed in conformity with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter or when lawfully authorized by the Security Council under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter.” Green, supra note 38, at 233.
parties—Nicaragua and the United States—disputed.\textsuperscript{55} This approach was also taken, for example, in the \textit{Oil Platforms} case where the \textit{jus cogens} norm was articulated as the “obligation imposed on all Members under Article 2(4) of the Charter,”\textsuperscript{56} and in oral submissions by Canada in the \textit{Fisheries Jurisdiction} case where the \textit{jus cogens} norm was articulated as “the Charter’s prohibition of the use of force – Article 2, paragraph 4.”\textsuperscript{57} Admittedly, the norm is sometimes articulated somewhat differently. This was true, for example, of Spain in the \textit{Fisheries Jurisdiction} case—“la norme impérative qui interdit l’usage et la menace du recours à la force.”\textsuperscript{58} It was also true in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e., Serbia and Montenegro, in the \textit{Legality of the Use of Force} case, which used the formulation: “the obligation not to resort to the use of force against another State.”\textsuperscript{59} These formulations, which may have simply lacked precision, appear to be aimed at the same concept. Alternatively, one might read these statements as encompassing the obligation

\textsuperscript{55} The ICJ stated:

Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits submitted in the present case states that the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations “has come to be recognized as \textit{jus cogens}.” The United States, in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility, found it material to quote the views of scholars that this principle is a “universal norm,” a “universal international law,” a “universally recognized principle of international law,” and a “principle of \textit{jus cogens}.”

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{56} Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran, \textit{Oil Platforms} (Iran v. U.S.), 1993 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 4.05 (June 8, 1993).

\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Fisheries Jurisdiction} (Spain v. Can.), Verbatim Record, ¶ 14 (June 17, 1998, 10:00 a.m.), www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/96/096-19980617-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UKW-8HF5].

\textsuperscript{58} Memorial of the Kingdom of Spain, \textit{Fisheries Jurisdiction} (Spain v. Can.), 1995 I.C.J. Pleadings ¶ 4 (Sept. 28, 1995).

not to use force as it is found in the UN Charter and parallel customary international law.\textsuperscript{60}

On balance, there appears quite broad agreement—including from both the ILC and arguably the ICJ\textsuperscript{61)—that there is such

\footnotesize{60. The Charter regime on the use of force also represents customary international law. Nicar. v. U.S. 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 188 ("[T]he principles as to the use of force incorporated in the United Nations Charter correspond, in essentials, to those found in customary international law.").

61. There remains a slight question whether the ICJ concluded there was such a norm or was simply reciting the ILC’s view. Green, supra note 38, at 223–224 (citing Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 151, 153 (separate opinion by Singh, J.); id. at 192, 199–200 (separate opinion by Sette-Camara, J.)) (‘‘It is the view of the present writer that the Court concluded here that the prohibition of the use of force was a peremptory norm, although it must be said that others have a different interpretation. . . . Strengthening the view that the Court has interpreted the prohibition of the use of force as a peremptory norm are statements made to this effect by judges in their individual opinions [in the Nicaragua case.]’’); see also Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 324, 329–30 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion by Simma, J.); id. at 246, 260 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.); id. at 290, 291 (dissenting opinion by Elaraby, J.); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 246, 254 (July 9) (separate opinion by Elaraby, J.) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].}
a peremptory norm.\textsuperscript{62} There is also fairly broad agreement\textsuperscript{63}—including from the ILC and arguably the ICJ\textsuperscript{64}—that its content is the use of force regime under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

D. \textit{The Obligation to Respect Jus Cogens Carries Over to the Security Council}

All states and bodies are bound to respect international law, which includes \textit{jus cogens}, including the Security Council.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, Judge Fitzmaurice dissenting in the \textit{Namibia} Advisory Opinion concluded that “the Security Council is as much subject to [international law] . . . as any of its individual member States are, [just as] the United Nations is itself a subject of international law. . . .”\textsuperscript{66} Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in the ICJ’s

\textsuperscript{62} “[A]n overwhelming majority of scholars view the prohibition as having a peremptory character.” Green, \textit{supra} note 38, at 216. For a lengthy list of scholars recognizing the peremptory norm, see \textit{id.} at 216 n.4 (compiling authority); \textit{see also} Johnston, \textit{supra} note 49; Ulf Linderfalk, \textit{The Source of Jus Cogens Obligations – How Legal Positivism Copes with Peremptory International Law}, 82 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 369, 369 (2013). One judge serving on the ICJ has stated that “[t]he prohibition of the use of force . . . is \textit{universally recognized as a jus cogens} principle, a peremptory norm from which no derogation is permitted.” Wall Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ at 254 (emphasis added) (separate opinion by Elaraby, J.).

Green himself, however, is skeptical if there is a peremptory norm, given that our understanding of what is prohibited under the Charter evolves over time (for example, potentially including cyber attacks and/or evolving notions of what is permitted as “self-defense”). He discounts the possibility, however, that the \textit{jus cogens} norm might also evolve over time; after all, our understanding of what genocide is varies somewhat over time, as judges interpret the statutory language slightly differently—yet, one does not argue that this disqualifies genocide from being a peremptory norm. \textit{See} Green, \textit{supra} note 38; for another skeptic, see A. Mark Weisburd, \textit{The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1995).

\textsuperscript{63} Green, \textit{supra} note 38, at 226 (“Of the numerous writers who have attested to the peremptory nature of the prohibition of the use of force, many have explicitly taken the view that Article 2(4) is, in itself, a \textit{jus cogens} norm.”).

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{See} sources cited \textit{infra} note 61.


\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
The Lockerbie case, Judge ad hoc Jennings eloquently affirmed that the Security Council is constrained by law: “all discretionary powers of lawful decision-making are necessarily derived from the law, and are therefore governed and qualified by the law, . . . It is not logically possible to claim to represent the power and authority of the law and, at the same time, claim to be above it.” Judge Weeramantry, also writing in dissent in Lockerbie, similarly concluded that: “The history of the United Nations Charter thus corroborates the view that a clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council’s powers is that those powers must be exercised in accordance with the well-established principles of international law.” Judge Bedjaoui, additionally writing in dissent in Lockerbie, similarly wrote: “is not the essential point of concern to us here the fact that the Council is bound to respect the principles of international law?”

In the Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also opined on the limits of the Security Council’s power, finding that the Council’s powers are not “unbound by law,” rather “[t]he Charter . . . speaks the language of specific powers, not of

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absolute fiat.” Scholars have similarly concluded that the Security Council is not above the law but subject to it.

70. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 28. The Appeals Chamber held:

> It is clear from this text [of Article 39 of the Charter] that the Security Council plays a pivotal role and exercises a very wide discretion under this Article. But this does not mean that its powers are unlimited. The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from the internal division of power within the Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as *legibus solutus* (unbound by law) . . . .

*Id.*

A *fortiori*, if the Security Council is subject to international law, it necessarily must be subject to *jus cogens* norms, as they are at the apex of the international legal system.\(^{72}\) Thus, ICJ judge James Crawford wrote: “It seems intuitively right that the Security Council should be bound by peremptory norms. They are by definition norms that cannot be derogated from except by subsequent norms of the same kind.”\(^{73}\) Simon Chesterman concedes:

> It is generally acknowledged that the Security Council’s powers are subject to the UN Charter and norms of *jus cogens*. . . . The Council does not operate free of legal constraint. In strict legal terms this means that the Council’s powers are exercised subject to the Charter and norms of *jus cogens*. More importantly, however, the Council’s authority derives from the rule of law—respect for its decisions depends on respect for the Charter and international law more generally.\(^{74}\)

the rules of general international law as well.”). Additionally, Alexander Orakhelashvili writes:

> In performing its tasks under the Charter, the Security Council is perhaps empowered to take decisions affecting the legal rights and duties of state and non-state actors, though this general power is subject to limitations. (The exclusion of the power to effect a permanent settlement is an instance of these limitations.) But this is not the same as having the Security Council exempted from the operation of law. That could not be reconciled with the Charter framework or practice. The ICJ, in *Namibia*, while interpreting the Council’s powers broadly, emphasized that the Council is subject to legal standards. The ICTY Appeals Chamber vigorously confirmed that the Council is not *legibus solutus* (unbound by law).


\(^{72}\) See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

\(^{73}\) See JAMES CRAWFORD, CHANGE, ORDER CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, 17–18 (2014).

This conclusion—that the Security Council is bound by *jus cogens*—can also be derived from application of the principle *nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet*, meaning that an international creature cannot acquire more powers than its creators. Hannah Yiu explains:

[A] further justification for *jus cogens* being a direct and autonomous legal limit on the [Security Council] comes from the fact that the [Security Council], despite its wide powers, has only those powers that have been conferred on it by the UN’s Member States. The [Security Council] is a creation of the UN, created by the UN’s Member States, all of whom are bound by *jus cogens* norms. It follows then that the [Security Council], as a creation of the UN, is also bound by *jus cogens* norms because an international creature cannot acquire more powers than its creators—*nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet*.76

E. The Obligation to Respect Jus Cogens also Carries over to the Permanent Members

It almost goes without saying that, if the Security Council as a whole is bound to respect *jus cogens*, which, as demonstrated

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19 (2008) (emphasis omitted); see also JEREMY MATAM FARRALL, UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 71 (2007) (“As [peremptory] norms are so essential [that they cannot be violated or derogated from], it can be argued that the Security Council is legally bound to respect them.”).


76. Hannah Yiu, Jus Cogens, the Veto and the Responsibility to Protect: A New Perspective, 7 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 207, 246 (2009) (citing August Reinisch, Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 851, 858 (2001)); Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 68 n.53 (“[S]tates cannot delegate to an international organization more powers than they themselves can exercise.”); id. at 79 (citing cases) (“The encroachment on *jus cogens* is clearly outside the Council’s competence. It is established in national and international jurisprudence (although on a different matter than considered here) that conduct outlawed under *jus cogens* is outside the functions of states. Organizations established by states cannot be endowed with functions and powers which states themselves are not entitled to exercise.”).
above, it is, then the permanent member states, which form a subset of the Council, similarly must be bound. This proposition can be derived a number of ways.

First, under the logic of the Tadić case, discussed above, the ICTY held that the Security Council’s “powers cannot . . . go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large [the United Nations].” Just as the Security Council, as an organ of the UN, cannot have powers greater than the United Nations, the same is true of individual permanent members. They cannot have powers greater than those of the Council. Thus, if the Council is bound to respect *jus cogens*, so too are individual permanent members.

Second, while the permanent members have an exceptional power granted to them under the UN Charter—the veto power—they are nonetheless still “states” and, as such, subject to respect *jus cogens*. Because *jus cogens* is “binding on all subjects of international law,” no exception is made, even for

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77. See discussion supra Part I.
78. Yiu, supra note 76.
80. Yiu, supra note 76.
81. See id. at 246–47.
82. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 68 (“Acts contrary to *jus cogens* are beyond the powers of an institution (*ultra vires*).”); Yiu, supra note 76, at 246 (“The [Security Council’s] acts are subject to *jus cogens* in the same way that acts of any other international actor would be[.]”).
83. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3 (explaining the veto power of permanent members as votes in the Security Council on non-procedural matters that “shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”).
84. Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 153 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998) (emphasis added) (“The most conspicuous consequence of this higher rank of *jus cogens* is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States through international treaties[.]”); see also Heieck, supra note 43, at 202 (“[T]he Charter, like all other multilateral treaties, is subservient to *jus cogens*.”).
85. Heieck, supra note 43, at 189 (emphasis added) (citing Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 9, 423) (“Given their non-derogable character, *jus cogens* norms are . . . superior to all
permanent members of the Security Council. The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in the Namibia case also supports this proposition. While Judge Fitzmaurice was writing on the topic of territorial sovereignty, he wrote: “This is a principle of international law that is well-established as any there can be,—and the Security Council is as much subject to it (for the United Nations is itself a subject of international) as any of its individual Member States are.”

Third, this conclusion can be reached under application of the principle nemo plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet—discussed above—that an international creature cannot acquire more powers than its creators. If states cannot violate jus cogens, then the states that created the UN, and with it the existence of permanent members of the Security Council, necessarily cannot have granted to those members the power to violate jus cogens.

Fourth, this conclusion can be reached yet another way. Under UN Charter Article 24(1), UN Member States conferred on the Security Council “primary responsibility for the sources and binding on all subjects of international law.”); see also Salahuddin Mahmud & Shafiqur Rahman, The Concept and Status of Jus Cogens: An Overview, 3 Int’l J. L. 111, 111 (2017) (“According to Oxford Dictionary of Law[,] jus cogens refers to a ‘rule or principle in international law that is so fundamental that it binds all states and does not allow any exception.’ Thus the concept of jus cogens in the context of international law indicates that it is a body of fundamental legal principle which is binding upon all members of the international community in all circumstances.”) (emphasis added).

86. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 69 (“The direct and immediate effect of jus cogens means that the Council’s acts are subject to it in the same way as the acts of any other actor.”); Hossain, supra note 43, at 78–79 (“States regard these rules [of jus cogens] as being so important to the international society of states and to how that society defines itself, such that they cannot conceive of an exception.”).


88. Yiu, supra note 76 and accompanying text.

89. Id.

90. Id. at 246–47.
maintenance of international peace and security,” and agreed that “in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.”91 If the Security Council “acts on their behalf,” and UN Member States cannot violate jus cogens, then in “acting on their behalf” neither should the Security Council nor any of its members—including its permanent members—violate jus cogens.92

Fifth, as will be discussed in the second half of this article, the Security Council’s powers are also limited by the UN’s Purposes and Principles,93 which include in Article 1(1) respect for international law,94 of which jus cogens forms a part. Accordingly, respect for jus cogens is also mandated by the UN Charter.95

91. UN Charter, art. 24, ¶ 1 (emphasis added); see also Anne Peters, The Security Council, Functions and Powers, Article 24, in 1 The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary ¶¶ 45–46 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (“The Security Council, being an organ of the United Nations, formally acts on behalf of that legal person and not on behalf of the members individually. The Charter’s term ‘on their behalf’ can best be understood as highlighting the fact that, despite the restricted membership of the Council, that body is supposed to act in the interests of all members . . . . ‘[t]he . . . powers vested in the Council under the Charter are in the nature of a trust and a delegation from the entire membership of the UN.’

92. Orakhelashvili, supra note 71, at 60, 68 (“If a relevant norm is peremptory, then states cannot derogate from it, establishing an organization with the power to act in disregard of jus cogens. Therefore, jus cogens is an inherent limitation on any organization’s powers . . . . As the International Law Commission (ILC) emphasized, states cannot escape the operation of jus cogens, particularly its invalidating power, through the establishment of an international organization.”).


94. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1.

95. See Part II infra. While the notion of jus cogens was admittedly not well-developed in 1945, the concept did exist, so all Security Council and permanent member powers were already subject to this kind of inherent limitation when the Charter was signed. See Hossain, supra note 43, at 73 (“The doctrine of international jus cogens was developed under a strong influence of natural law concepts, which maintain that states cannot be absolutely free in establishing their contractual relations. States were obliged to respect certain fundamental principles deeply rooted in the international community.”).
F. A Security Council Resolution in Conflict with Jus Cogens Would Be Void

Individual judges serving on the ICJ as well as numerous scholars make clear that a Security Council resolution in conflict with *jus cogens* would be void. While the actual mechanical act of voting might not be void, the resulting resolution would be.

This result is explained by Judge *ad hoc* Eli Lauterpacht in the *Application of the Genocide Convention* Case.\(^96\) There, in a separate opinion, Judge Lauterpacht found that Security Council Resolution 713\(^97\)—which imposed an arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina that inadvertently assisted the better-armed Serbia side—“can be seen as having in effect called on Members of the United Nations, albeit unknowingly and assuredly unwillingly, to become in some degree supporters of the genocidal activity of the Serbs and in this manner and to that extent to act contrary to a rule of *jus cogens*.\(^98\) In addressing the legal consequences that flow from this analysis, Judge Lauterpacht considered one possibility to be that “when the operation of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) began to make Members of the United Nations accessories to genocide it ceased to be valid and binding in its operation against Bosnia-Herzegovina[,] and that Members of the United Nations then became free to disregard it.”\(^99\) Thus, a Security Council resolution that caused states, even inadvertently, to assist genocide—an act contrary to *jus cogens*—would cease to be valid.

Judge de Castro, in the *Namibia* Advisory Opinion, reached a similar conclusion in his Separate Opinion that: “[t]he Court, as a legal organ, cannot co-operate with a [Security Council or General Assembly] resolution which is clearly void, contrary to the rules of the Charter, or contrary to the principles of law.”\(^100\)

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99. Id. ¶ 103.
100. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
He thus implies that Security Council resolutions cannot be contrary to the Charter or principles of law, and that a defective resolution would be void. Judge Dugard also concludes in his Separate Opinion in the Armed Activities case that “States must deny recognition to a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm.”101 This would again imply that a Security Council resolution should not be creating or recognizing a serious breach of a peremptory norm, i.e., the Security Council must respect *jus cogens*.

Kamrul Hossain also writes that violations of *jus cogens* limit the “absolute discretion of the Security Council,” and concludes that “the Security Council itself is also under an obligation to follow such legal principles,” otherwise it would be acting *ultra vires*.102 Additional scholars concur that the Security Council is unable in its resolutions to violate *jus cogens*.103


103. Alexander Orakhelashvili writes:

Since peremptory norms safeguard the community interest as opposed to individual state interests, they possess absolute validity; this is in contrast to the relative validity of ordinary or non-peremptory norms. . . . Their rationale consists in invalidating or *prevailing over incompatible acts and transactions* in order to ensure the paramount superiority of fundamental community values and interests. . . . [T]he Security Council must respect peremptory norms because the core values protected by *jus cogens* are not derogable or waivable in the sense of *jus dispositivum*. A Council resolution violating *jus cogens* would indeed be a derogation from *jus cogens*, as it would be an attempt to use the UN system for the establishment of a new legal regime through a resolution contrary to *jus cogens*.

Orakhelashvili, *supra* note 71, at 62–63 (emphasis added); *see also* id. at 88 (emphasis added) (“[O]ne should also bear in mind the special role of peremptory norms in the contemporary international legal system, and consider that the continuance in force of a Council resolution which is in conflict with *jus cogens* is nothing but the maintenance of a situation that is morally and ethically repugnant in the eyes of the international community.”); Stefano Congiu, *Jus Cogens: The History, Challenges and Hope of “A Giant
G. Application to Russia’s Veto

Let us return to the context of Russia’s February 25, 2022 veto. As of that date, it appeared that a peremptory norm of international law was being violated\textsuperscript{104}—i.e., use of force contrary to the UN Charter—or that is the working assumption of this article. Additionally, the Security Council was prepared to address the situation through a resolution that had been co-sponsored by 81 UN Member States.\textsuperscript{105} Specifically, in Security Council resolution S/RES/155 (2022)\textsuperscript{106}—which was vetoed\textsuperscript{107}—the Security Council would have:

Endors[ed] the Secretary-General’s call for the Russian Federation to stop its offensive against Ukraine,

Condemn[ed] the 23 February 2022 declaration by the Russian Federation of a “special military operation” in Ukraine,

\textsuperscript{104} See caveat supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{106} See generally S.C. Res. S/2022/155, supra note 8.

1. Reaffirm[ed] its commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;

2. Deplore[d] in the strongest terms the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine in violation of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter;

3. Decide[d] that the Russian Federation shall immediately cease its use of force against Ukraine and shall refrain from any further unlawful threat or use of force against any UN member state;

4. Decide[d] that the Russian Federation shall immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;

5. Deplore[d] the Russian Federation’s 21 February 2022 decision related to the status of certain areas of [the] Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a violation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; [and]

6. Decide[d] the Russian Federation shall immediately and unconditionally reverse the decision related to the status of certain areas of [the] Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine;

7. Call[ed] on the parties to abide by the Minsk agreements and to work constructively in relevant international frameworks, including in the Normandy Format and Trilateral Contact Group, towards their full implementation;

8. Call[ed] upon all parties to allow and facilitate the rapid, safe, and unhindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in need in Ukraine, to protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and persons in vulnerable situations, including children;

9. Condemn[ed] all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and call[ed] upon all parties to strictly respect the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as applicable, and to respect human rights;

10. Welcome[d] and urges the continued efforts by the Secretary-General, UN Member States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and other international and regional organizations, to support de-escalation of the current situation, and also the efforts of the United Nations to respond to the humanitarian and refugee crisis that the Russian Federation’s aggression has created;

11. Decide[d] to remain actively seized of this matter.\textsuperscript{108}

By vetoing all these measures, Russia—which should not have been able to exercise its veto at all as the resolution was adopted under Chapter VI and not Chapter VII\textsuperscript{109}—helped facilitate the status quo, i.e., what appears to be a continuing \textit{jus cogens} violation.

H. Russia’s Veto Is at Odds with the Obligations Reflected in the ILC’s Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts

The ILC, in its Articles of Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,\textsuperscript{110} articulates the obligations states hold vis-à-vis \textit{jus cogens}, i.e., when there is a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law occurring.\textsuperscript{111} Article 41 states that:

1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach [of a peremptory norm of international law] . . . [and]

\textsuperscript{108} S.C. Res. S/2022/155, supra note 8.

\textsuperscript{109} U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 3 (“[I]n decisions under Chapter VI, . . . a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.”). This exclusion from voting applies to both elected and permanent members of the Council. Wouters and Ruys point out that the exclusion has been applied inconsistently. Jan Wouters & Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?, 9 ROYAL INST. FOR INT’L RELS. 5, 12–14 (2005).


\textsuperscript{111} Id. arts. 26, 40–41.
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach [of a peremptory norm of international law] . . . , nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.\textsuperscript{112}

Article 40(2) of the ARSIWA specifies that “[a] breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the responsible State to fulfil the obligation.”\textsuperscript{113}

ARSIWA Article 41 thus encompasses three related obligations: (1) states must cooperate to bring to an end serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law; (2) states must not recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law; and (3) states must not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation.\textsuperscript{114}

Through its veto, an argument can be made that Russia: (1) failed to cooperate to end its own serious breach\textsuperscript{115} of a peremptory norm of international law; (2) blocked other states serving on the Security Council from exercising their responsibility to cooperate to end a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law;\textsuperscript{116} and (3) rendered aid and assistance in maintaining the situation where there is a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law occurring.

While the ILC’s ARSIWA remain uncodified, international courts and tribunals have treated them as a source of international law on questions of state responsibility.\textsuperscript{117} For

\textsuperscript{112} Id. art. 41.
\textsuperscript{113} Id. art. 40, ¶ 2.
\textsuperscript{114} Id. art. 41.
\textsuperscript{115} It is inconceivable that Russia’s breach is not a serious one. See G.A. Res. ES-11/1, supra note 6 (“The military operations of the Russian Federation inside the sovereign territory of Ukraine are on a scale that the international community has not seen in Europe in decades and . . . urgent action is needed to save this generation from the scourge of war.”).
\textsuperscript{116} Russia’s veto stopped an affirmative vote by the Security Council, and therefore inhibited other states from being able to follow through to try to end a serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law.
\textsuperscript{117} James R. Crawford, State Responsibility, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law ¶ 65 (2006), https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1093?prd=EPIL; see also U.N. Secretary-
instance, the ARSIWA have been widely cited before and by the ICJ, including Article 41, which has been referred to at least twenty-three times. Thus, for example, the ICJ applied the obligations in Article 41 in the *Wall* and *Chagos* Advisory Opinions, suggesting those obligations represent binding law. Judge Dugard in the *Armed Activities* case also plainly stated: “States must deny recognition to a situation created by the serious breach of a peremptory norm (Arts. 40 and 41 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts . . . ).”

Accordingly, while Russia’s invasion also constitutes, or appears to constitute, a direct violation of *jus cogens*, the purpose of this article is to examine whether Russia used its veto to further its own *jus cogens* violation contrary to obligations of

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119. In the *Wall* Advisory Opinion, the ICJ applied Article 41 when it stated: “[A]ll States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem. They are also under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation . . . .” *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 135, ¶ 159 (July 9).

120. After determining that “the decolonization of Mauritius was not conducted in a manner consistent with the right of peoples to self-determination . . . ”—which it recognized as an *erga omnes* obligation—and that “ . . . the United Kingdom’s continued administration of the Chagos Archipelago constitutes a wrongful act entailing the international responsibility of that State . . . ,” the ICJ held that “the United Kingdom has an obligation to bring to an end its administration of the Chagos Archipelago as rapidly as possible, and that all Member State must co-operate with the United Nations to complete the decolonization of Mauritius.” *Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965*, Advisory Opinion, 2019 I.C.J. 95, ¶¶ 177, 182 (Feb. 25).


122. See caveat *supra* notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
international law. Admittedly, it might be difficult to apply the author’s conclusions to any one veto, particularly in a timely enough fashion to be useful, as this might necessitate obtaining a ruling from the ICJ that there is a *jus cogens* violation occurring and that the veto in question helped aid or assist in maintaining the situation by furthering the status quo. Yet, there is most definitely a legality problem with vetoes that block measures designed to stop or prevent *jus cogens* violations, as Russia’s veto appears to have done.

III. AGGRESSION AND THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Another tension that existed when Russia cast its veto on February 25, 2022, was that, on that date, Russia was violating—or apparently violating, as none of these issues have yet been adjudicated—several provisions of the UN Charter. Russia was simultaneously serving on the UN Security Council—the very body charged, under the Charter, with “primary responsibility for

123. The author has several ideas for states to operationalize these arguments; obtaining an ICJ opinion is one such idea. See infra note 124; see also infra notes 203–207 (discussing three approaches for this to occur: states taking up the arguments; the General Assembly passing a resolution; the General Assembly requesting an Advisory Opinion).

124. Because of this difficulty, the author, in her book, argues (vis-à-vis the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity) that the General Assembly should request an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on a question such as: does existing international law contain limitations on the use of the veto power by permanent members of the UN Security Council in situations whether there is ongoing genocide, crimes against humanity, and/or war crimes? TRAHAN, supra note 14, at 143. This could help clarify that a veto must not be used to further *jus cogens* violations and thereby could potentially start to change the voting behavior of the permanent members. While an Advisory Opinion is non-binding, Advisory Opinions are considered highly authoritative. See FARRALL, supra note 74, at 75 (“The Court may . . . pronounce on the Council’s powers under its advisory jurisdiction and its pronouncements [while advisory] would carry considerable weight as authoritative findings of law . . . .”).

125. See caveat supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.

126. See U.N. Charter arts. 1–2, especially art. 2 ¶ 4.
the maintenance of international peace and security—while, through its veto, blocking the UN Security Council from being able to carry out its core mandate. This raises the question whether veto use—created by Article 27(3) of the Charter—is above all other obligations under the UN Charter, and can be used freely to further continuing Charter violations, even when the violations are of the very Purposes and Principles of the UN. The second half of this article explores these tensions.

A. The Security Council’s Powers Are Limited by the UN Charter, Including the Requirement of Acting in Accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles

Just as international law provides some outer limits on the UN Security Council’s—and thereby permanent members’—powers, so too do the terms of the UN Charter. Various judges of the ICJ explain that the Council’s powers are constrained by the provisions of the UN Charter, and, particularly, are limited by the requirement of acting in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles. The latter is also expressly stated in Article 24(2) of the Charter: “[i]n discharging [its] duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”

Thus, in terms of adhering to the UN Charter, specifically related to Security Council and General Assembly voting, the ICJ in the Conditions of Admission Advisory Opinion explained:

The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitation on its powers or criteria for its judgment. To ascertain whether an organ has

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127. Id. art. 24, ¶ 1. It is for that purposes that the Security Council is given its extraordinary powers under Chapter VII. See id. arts. 39–41.

128. But see supra note 13.

129. See supra note 19.


freedom of choice for its decisions, reference must be made to the terms of its constitution.132

The ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadić similarly affirmed that the Security Council is bound by the Charter:

The Security Council is an organ of an international organization, established by a treaty which serves as a constitutional framework for that organization. The Security Council is thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under the constitution may be. Those powers cannot, in any case, go beyond the limits of the Organization at large, not to mention other specific limitations or those which may derive from the internal division of power within the Organization. In any case, neither the text nor the spirit of the Charter conceives of the Security Council as \textit{legibus solutus} (unbound by law).133

Additionally, Judge Jennings in his dissent in \textit{Lockerbie},134 also relied upon above, made clear that the Security Council is subject to legal constraints, including those contained in the Charter. He wrote: “It is not logically possible to claim to represent the power and authority of the law and, at the same time, claim to be above the law. That this is true of the Security Council is clear from the terms of Article 24, paragraph 2, of the Charter . . . .”135

As to the need to adhere to the UN’s Purposes and Principles, this was additionally affirmed in the \textit{Namibia} Advisory

132. \textit{Id.} at 64.


135. \textit{Id.} at 110; \textit{see also} Yiu, \textit{supra} note 76, at 241 (summarizing these cases: “[t]he [Security Council] is not a sovereign body and its powers are conferred to it by the members of the UN through the medium of its constituent treaty, the UN Charter. It follows that as a creation of the UN, the [Security Council]’s powers are not unfettered and that it must operate within the parameters of UN Charter norms.”).
Opinion,136 where the ICJ wrote that “the Members of the United Nations have conferred upon the Security Council powers commensurate with its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. The only limitations are the fundamental principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Charter . . .”137 Judge Weeramantry, writing in dissent in the Lockerbie case, similarly wrote:

Article 24 itself offers us an immediate signpost to such a circumscribing boundary [on the powers of the Security Council] when it provides in Article 24(2) that the Security Council, in discharging its duties under Article 24(1) “shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” The duty is imperative and the limits are categorically stated.138

Judge Lauterpacht also wrote in his separate opinion in the Application of the Genocide Convention case that one should not “overlook the significance of the provision in Article 24(2) of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”139 Numerous scholars concur with this analysis.140


137. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).


This concept can additionally be seen in UN Charter Article 24(1), which provides that in carrying out its “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,” “the Security Council acts on the[] behalf” of UN Member States.\textsuperscript{141} If UN Member States are bound by the Charter’s Purposes and Principles (as they are),\textsuperscript{142} then, the Security Council, in acting “on the[] behalf” of UN Member States is necessarily also bound.\textsuperscript{143}

Finally, the notion that the Security Council’s powers are limited by the UN’s Purposes and Principles is further reinforced by the fact that UN Charter Article 25 states that UN Member States agree “to accept and carry out” Security Council decisions “in accordance with” the Charter.\textsuperscript{144} Thus, in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ wrote that the Security Council resolutions under consideration were “adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter and in accordance with its Articles 24 and 25,” and “[t]he decisions [were] consequently binding on all States Member of the United Nations, which [were] thus under obligation to accept and carry them out.”\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Guardian of the UN Legality?}, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 519, 523 (1992);
\item \textsuperscript{141} U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{142} Id. art. 2 (“The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles . . . .”) (emphasis added).
\item \textsuperscript{143} See also Peters, supra note 71, at 35 (explaining this conclusion).
\item \textsuperscript{144} U.N. Charter art. 25 (emphasis added).
\end{itemize}
B. The Permanent Members’ Powers Are Limited by the UN Charter, Including the Requirement of Acting in Accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles

If the Security Council as a whole is mandated to act in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles, then so too are individual members of the Security Council, and therefore necessarily also permanent member states. This conclusion that permanent member states are bound, also explained in the author’s book, can be derived in a number of ways, some of which parallel arguments made in the first half of this article.

First, if the Security Council is bound, then a subset of the Security Council—its permanent members—cannot have greater power than the organ as a whole. This argument is supported by the logic in Tadić (also relied on above) where the ICTY Appeals Chamber recognized that the Security Council’s “powers cannot . . . go beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Organization at large [the United Nations].” Logically, if the Security Council’s powers cannot go beyond the powers of the UN, then the powers of individual permanent members cannot exceed the powers of the Security Council.

Second, UN Member States are bound by the Purposes and Principles of the UN. Specifically, Article 2 states that “[t]he Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.” Thus, the permanent members are also bound by the UN’s Purposes and Principles by virtue of the simple fact that they are also UN Member States.

Third, if UN Member States are bound by the Charter, they cannot have granted, nor did they purport to grant, any power to permanent member states to act beyond the Charter’s terms.

146. TRAHAN, supra note 14, at 193.
147. Id. at 192.
149. U.N. Charter art. 2 (emphasis added).
150. See Yiu, supra note 76, at 246 (“The [Security Council], despite its wide powers, has only those powers that have been conferred on it by the UN’s Member States.”); DE WET, supra note 140, 189 n.46 (“The Charter can neither grant the Security Council more powers than the member states intended it to have, nor can it enable the
C. The UN’s Purposes and Principles

Under the Charter, the UN’s Purposes, defined in Article 1, include:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; . . . [and]

3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. . . . 151

The Charter’s preamble additionally reminds us that one of the central purposes for the creation of the United Nations—which followed closely on the heels of World War II—was: “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow on mankind . . . .”153 With that in mind, the preamble states that countries “unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.”154

Thus, the UN’s Purposes encompass: (1) preventing and removing threats to the peace and suppressing acts of aggression; (2) acting in conformity with principles of justice and international law; (3) achieving international co-operation in

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151. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶¶ 1, 3.
152. For one account of the negotiations of the UN Charter, see OONA A. HATHAWAY & SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, THE INTERNATIONALISTS: HOW A RADICAL PLAN TO OUTLAW WAR REMADE THE WORLD (2017).
154. Id.
solving international problems of a humanitarian character; and (4) promoting and encouraging respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{155} Additionally, the UN’s Principles, defined in Article 2 of the Charter, include the following obligations:

2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations . . . .\textsuperscript{156}

Thus, the UN’s Principles encompass: (1) the obligation of good faith; (2) the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means; and (3) the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force contrary to Article 2(4).

D. \textit{The Obligation to Adhere to the UN’s Purposes and Principles Pertains to Veto Use}

Writing on the obligation of good faith, for example, various scholars agree that it extends to good faith in voting (which would include veto use). Relying on the \textit{Conditions of Admission} Advisory Opinion, Anne Peters concludes that the obligation of good faith carries over to Security Council voting:

[J]udges of the ICJ reminded all UN members that when participating in a . . . decision either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly the Member is “legally entitled to make its consent . . . dependent on any political consideration which seem to it to be relevant. [However,] [i]n the exercise of this power the member is legally bound to have regard to the principle of good faith.” UN members \textit{must exercise their voting power “in good faith, in}

\textsuperscript{155} \textit{See id.} art. 1.

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Id.} art. 2, ¶¶ 2–4.
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Organization and in such a manner as not to involve any breach of the Charter."  

Robert Kolb, in Bruno Simma’s *Commentary* on the Charter, similarly writes:

> Good faith . . . sets a limit to the admissible exercise of discretion. The principle forbade a State to make its vote dependent on conditions that were not inherently connected with the sense and purpose of the Charter provision to be applied. The fact that the rules are directed to a specific purpose provides a yardstick for deciding what is required by good faith in the individual case.

He continues: “The objective of a proper functioning of the Organization has also been claimed as a limit to the use of the right of veto. Good faith is in such a case the legal vector through which the abuse of the voting right could be sanctioned as being the expression of a policy alien and irreconcilable with the aims of the Organization.”  

Hannah Yiu, writing on the crime of genocide, similarly concludes: “there is a strong argument that the permanent five should restrict their powers of veto in cases of genocide or suspected genocide so that the [Security Council] is acting in good faith towards the international community, in accordance with the Principles of the Charter.”

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159. *Id.* ¶ 23.

160. Yiu, *supra* note 76, at 247. Marboe also sees the principle of good faith as relevant to Security Council voting. Marboe, *supra* note 140, at 125 (footnotes omitted) (“All UN members, when participating in a political decision in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, are legally entitled to make their consent dependent on any political consideration. However, in the exercise
Andrew Carswell additionally concurs on the issue of good faith: “Reading [A]rticles 2(2), 24 and 1(1) collectively, we may deduce that the [permanent members] are obliged to discharge in good faith their responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Employment of the veto in a manner that does not coincide with this responsibility arguably amounts to a breach of the good faith requirement.”

Carswell reaches this conclusion based in part on a statement made in 1945 in San Francisco by four of the permanent members where they assured other states that the veto would not be used abusively. They stated: “It is not to be assumed . . . that the permanent Members, any more than the non-permanent Members, would use their ‘veto’ power willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council.”

Noting also the obligation generally to act in good faith, Carswell concludes: “It was on this basis that the UN Charter was ultimately ratified.”

Scholars also take the view that veto use could constitute an “abuse of rights” (abus de droit)—which would be antithetical to satisfying the obligation of good faith. Andrew Carswell, for example, opines that “taking even a conservative view of the doctrine of abuse of rights, it is arguable that an employment of the veto in a blatantly mala fide manner can be characterized as legally abusive.” He concludes:

employment of the veto can arguably be viewed as “abusive” in certain circumstances, even if [A]rticle 27(3) is

of this power, the member is bound to have regard to the principle of good faith.”

161. Carswell, supra note 140, at 470 (emphasis added and omitted).

162. It was originally envisioned that there would be four permanent members—the US, UK, USSR, and China—with France later added. See The Yalta Conference, 1945, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf [https://perma.cc/8FYF-EC67].

163. Carswell, supra note 140, at 471 n.72.


165. Carswell, supra note 140, at 471.

166. Id.
not breached as such. If a permanent member exercises its veto in a bad-faith manner, legally constituting an abuse of the right contained in Article 27(3)—and consequently in violation of the responsibility conferred upon it by the international community on whose behalf it acts—it can be logically inferred that the Security Council is not “exercising [in the dispute or situation in question] the functions assigned to it in the present Charter.”

Anne Peters agrees, writing: “it seems possible to qualify the exercise of the veto in a [core crimes] situation as an *abus de droit*.” Other scholars agree. Various states have taken similar

167. Id. See also Bardo Fassbender, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective 175 (1998) (concluding that use of the veto to prevent an amendment to the UN Charter for reasons of purely national interest would constitute an abuse of right).

168. Peters, supra note 71, at 39. She explains:

Members of the Security Council act as delegates of all other UN members, and as trustees of the international community. Due to this *triplement fonctionnel*, *their voting behaviour is subject to legal limits*. Their position as trustees prohibits them handling their participation rights in the collective body in an arbitrary fashion. As a minimum, the fiduciary obligation of the members of the Security Council brings with it an obligation to balance all relevant aspects. This means that the rule of law not only prohibits arbitrary decisions of the Security Council as a whole, as stated above, but should also govern the Council members’ votes approving or preventing arbitrary decisions.

*Id.* (emphasis added) (citing Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 82, ¶ 20 (May 28) (dissenting opinion of Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair & Read, JJ.) (“[T]he members of the Security Council... [act] on behalf of all the Members of the United Nations.”)); see also Georges A. J. Scelle, *Le phénomène juridique de dédoublement fonctionnel, in Rechtsfragen der Internationalen Organisation* 324 (Walter Schätzle & Hans Jürgen Schlochauer eds., 1956) (coining the phrase *dédoublement fonctionnel*).

169. See, e.g., Marboe, supra note 140, at 130 (“[A]lthough it may be the right of a [permanent member] to exercise the veto, its exercise in a concrete situation may be abusive.”); Yiu, supra note 76, at 244 (emphasis added) (“It is arguable that the use of the veto in a case of genocide in which intervention is clearly warranted and would otherwise have been authorized would be just such an *abuse*...
positions in formal statements made at the UN that veto use can constitute an abuse of the veto power.\textsuperscript{170}

While the law discussed above focusses on the obligation of good faith (and its antithesis, the abuse of rights) contained as one of the UN’s Principles in Article 2(2) of the Charter, the ICJ in its decisions discussed above makes clear that the Security Council’s (and hence permanent members’\textsuperscript{1}) power is limited by the UN’s Purposes and Principles—suggesting \textit{all} of the Purposes and Principles matter.\textsuperscript{171} Various sources, for example, also make clear that the obligation to respect human rights, one of the UN’s Purposes, also limits Security Council power.\textsuperscript{172} Thus, neither in

\begin{quote}
of \textit{powers}, in contravention of the Charter’s Purposes and Principles, and thus unenforceable against member states.”).
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{171} See discussion \textit{supra} Parts II.A–C.

\textsuperscript{172} At least two ICJ cases recognize that human rights violations violate the Purposes and Principles of the UN. Akande, \textit{supra} note 71, at 324 (citing United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24) (holding that “[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraints in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations[.]”); Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57 (June 21) (finding the “denial [by South Africa] of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.”)). Additional legal scholars similarly recognize that the Purposes of the UN mandate respect for human rights, and this requirement accordingly limits Security Council power. See Peters, \textit{supra} note 71, at 17 (“The Security Council is bound at least by the ‘Purposes and Principles’ of the Charter (cf. Article 24(2) of the UN Charter), which include customary human rights law[]”); Orakhelashvili, \textit{supra} note 71, at 64 (“The Security Council can never be entitled to infringe upon human rights embodied in universal human rights instruments.”). Jordan Paust writes:

The first such limitation [on Security Council power] can be found in paragraph 2 of Article 24, which assures a constitutional limit on power when directing that the Council, in discharging its duties with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, “shall act
its resolutions nor veto use by its permanent members should the Security Council be violating any of the UN’s Purposes or Principles.

Furthermore, it does not appear to matter that the Security Council might be acting under Chapter VII. Article 24 expressly states:

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

Thus, the obligation to adhere to the UN’s Purposes and Principles is specifically mentioned as applying even when the Security Council is discharging its Chapter VII powers and duties.

in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” As noted in Article 1 of the Charter, such Purposes and Principles include human rights. . . . Thus, the constituted authority of the Security Council is conditioned by the need to serve, among other goals, human rights. . . .

Paust, supra note 145, at 15–16; see also Akande, supra note 71, at 323 (“[I]t would be anachronistic if the Security Council, an organ of the United Nations, was itself empowered to violate human rights when the whole tenor of the Charter is to promote the protection of human rights by and in States.”); Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 29 (June 18, 1997) (“[T]he protection of International Human Rights is the responsibility of all United Nations organs, the Security Council included, without any limitation, in conformity with the UN Charter.”).


174. Admittedly, the requirement of the Security Council’s acting in accordance with international law, including jus cogens, is somewhat complex. There are times when the Security Council seems to be permitted to violate what would otherwise be required
E. Application of the UN’s Purposes and Principles to Russia’s Veto

Let us now return to Russia’s veto cast on February 25, 2022175 and how it measures up to the requirement of acting in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles.

On the date of its veto, Russia was violating—or a prima facie case exists that it appeared to be violating176—numerous of the UN’s Purposes and Principles. Specifically, Russia was, or under international law. For example, its Chapter VII, Article 42 powers to implement forceful measures could otherwise be seen to violate the sovereignty of the country in question (and the prohibition against aggression), were they not expressly authorized under the Charter. U.N. Charter art. 42.

The requirement of acting in conformity with the principles of international law and jus cogens probably needs to be read in this light—that the Security Council cannot violate general principles of international law (for example, pass a discriminatory resolution), but certainly has the powers granted under the Charter. See, e.g., Nico Krisch, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Introduction to Chapter VII: The General Framework, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1259 (3rd ed. 2012) (citations omitted) (“Peremptory norms of international law are often regarded as a stricter limit on the [Security Council]. Many commentators have argued that these norms pose limits to Chapter VII powers since no international treaty, including the UN Charter, can derogate from them, and [Articles] 53 and 64 of the [VCLT] may seem to indicate such a result. The ICTY has followed this line, and several domestic and regional courts have adopted it with a particular view to human rights protections.”). Thus, even a Chapter VII force authorization would have limits such that jus cogens is respected—for example, the resolution could not violate “intransgressible” rules of International Humanitarian Law such as the need to respect distinction and proportionality, just as it could not authorize the commission of genocide. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8) (“intransgressible” rules of International Humanitarian Law are peremptory norms); Paust, supra note 145, at 16 (emphasis added) (“[J]us cogens prohibitions, such as the prohibitions of aggressive force and genocide, should condition and limit U.N. peace and security powers. In particular, Security Council actions under Chapter VII of the Charter generally must not serve to encourage aggression and genocide. . . . To the extent that they do, Members should not be bound[].”).

175. S.C. Res. S/2022/155, supra note 8..
176. See caveat supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
appeared to be, violating the first Purpose of the UN by failing to “maintain international peace and security.” The day prior, forces of the Russian Federation launched a massive air and ground attack on the territory of Ukraine, also using the territory of Belarus as a launching ground for the invasion. The attack was antithetical to maintaining “international peace and security.”

Through its invasion, Russia was additionally failing to act “in conformity with” the obligation to adhere to “international law,” also required by Article 1(1). Specifically, as demonstrated in Part I of this article, Russia was violating, or appeared to be violating, the *jus cogens* norm against aggression (use of force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter).

On the date of its veto, Russia was also violating, or appeared to be violating, the third Purposes of the UN, in that it was failing to “achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of [a] . . . humanitarian character.” It was, in fact, in the process of creating a massive humanitarian crisis. Its bombardments eventually created massive refugee and IDP flows that resulted in the displacement of millions of individuals. The invasion also created the risk of mass famine in numerous


179. See discussion *supra* Part I.

180. U.N. Charter, art. 1, ¶ 3; see, e.g., Ellyatt, *supra* note 178.

181. Jacob Roberts, *Four Numbers that Help to Illustrate the Ukrainian Refugee Crisis*, INT’L MED. CORPS UK, https://internationalmedicalcorps.org/story/four-numbers-that-help-to-illustrate-the-ukrainian-refugee-crisis/ (“According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 8 million Ukrainians have fled the country, while 7.7 million have been forced from their homes and become internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside the country.”) [https://perma.cc/3JYP-GJKA].
additional countries due to Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian Black Sea ports used to export wheat. Such behavior is antithetical to cooperation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character.

Through its military assault on Ukraine, including apparent targeting of civilians and civilian objects and many other suspected war crimes, Russia was additionally failing in its obligation to promote and encourage respect for human rights. Russia would eventually deprive large sections of the Ukrainian population of food, water, shelter, healthcare, education, and other fundamental human rights—including, most significantly, deprivation of the right to life. Such conduct is the antithesis of respect for human rights.

On the date of its veto, Russia was additionally violating, or apparently violating, the second Principle of the UN—to act in good faith—in many ways, including breaching its ceasefire obligation under the Minsk Accords as well as the obligation under the Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine’s territorial


186. Green, supra note 38, at 221 (“It is always worth remembering . . . that the use of military force usually involves the systematic killing of human beings, often on a vast scale.”); Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update 22 August 2022, U.N. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Aug. 22, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/08/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-22-august-2022 (confirming that the civilian death toll in Ukraine as of August 21, 2022, is 5,587, with the actual toll thought to be significantly higher) [https://perma.cc/J6DA-XE89].
sovereignty. Russia was also violating the third Principle of the UN—to settle disputes by peaceful means—and the fourth Principle of the UN—the core obligation in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter to refrain from the threat or use of force “against the territorial integrity or political independence of” Ukraine.

All told, through its veto, Russia was able to perpetuate the status quo—that is, its veto helped enable the continuation of each of these violations. The other members on the Council, or at least the nine necessary for Security Council action, had a plan to address Russia’s aggression through a variety of measures detailed in draft Security Council resolution 155 (2022). By exercising the veto, Russia stopped the UN Security Council from being able to implement these measures. In fact, in recognition of the Security Council’s inability to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council took the fairly unusual step of

187. Under the Minsk Accords, Russia and Ukraine agreed, among other things, to a ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine; under the Budapest Memorandum, Russia, the UK, and the US recommitted to respect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty and not to use force against its territorial integrity, when Russia and the US persuaded Ukraine to relinquish former Soviet nuclear weapons, turning them over to Russia. See S.C. Res. 2202, annex I (Feb. 17, 2015) (on the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements); Permanent Reps. of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the U.K. and Northern Ireland and the U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated Dec. 7, 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/49/765 (Dec. 19, 1994).

188. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 3.

189. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. As mentioned, if there were to be a case for state, or individual criminal, responsibility, whether or not there was an Article 2(4) violation would need to be adjudicated.

190. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2 (“Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.”); S/2022/155: Overview, supra note 105 (reporting that in the instant situation, there were 11 affirmative votes, with Russia vetoing and three members abstaining (China, India, and the United Arab Emirates)).

passing a Uniting for Peace resolution, thereby triggering an emergency special session of the General Assembly.192

Thus, on the date of its veto, Russia, was failing to act in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles at two levels: (a) it was violating, or apparently violating, numerous of the UN’s Purposes and Principles through its invasion of Ukraine, and (b) it was able to further (perpetuate and aid) these violations of the UN’s Purposes and Principles by ensuring, through its veto, that no effective response came from the Security Council.

This use of the veto is all the more problematic because, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia is one of the countries carrying the heaviest burden to maintain international peace and security.193 Specifically, it is one of the states authorized under the Charter to determine when there has been a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,”194 and given the responsibility of taking provisional, non-forceful, and/or forceful measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.195 Through its veto, Russia was thus able to block the Security Council from carrying out its mandate to maintain international peace and security as it is charged with under the Charter.196 Russia’s veto additionally blocked the Security Council as well as other individual states serving on it, from being able to discharge their obligations in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles.197

192. S.C. Res. 2623 (Feb. 27, 2022) (“Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 8979th meeting has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security . . . .”).


194. Id. art. 39.

195. Id. arts. 39–42.

196. See id.

197. That is, states serving on the Council, and the Council as a whole, were: (1) unable to prevent and remove threats to the peace and suppress acts of aggression; (2) unable to act in conformity with principles of justice and international law; (3) unable to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character; and (4) unable to promote and encourage respect for human rights—as mandated by the UN’s Purposes. They were also unable to settle disputes by peaceful means—as mandated by the UN’s Principles. See id. arts. 1–2.
F. Operationalizing These Legal Obligations

It may be difficult to operationalize the legal obligations discussed in this article, yet an Advisory Opinion could be sought from the ICJ by the UN General Assembly. It might, for example, inquire whether, on the date of the veto, Russia was acting in conformity with the UN’s Purposes and Principles as well as *jus cogens*, as discussed above, and whether Russia’s veto helped enable its continuing violations of the UN’s Purposes and Principles, and *jus cogens*. The consequences of a veto that is not within Security Council/permanent member powers—one that is not in conformity with the UN’s Purposes and Principles or obligations regarding *jus cogens*—is that it would be *ultra vires*, i.e., void.

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198. U.N. Charter art. 96, ¶ 1. The ICJ is also empowered to receive requests for advisory opinions from the Security Council, although it is unlikely that there would be sufficient votes for such a request if it relates to veto use. Id., art. 96, ¶ 2. Of the permanent members, only the UK has consented to the ICJ hearing contentious cases against it based on general jurisdiction—i.e., not based on a specific treaty that provides for such jurisdiction. See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. OF JUST., https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations [https://perma.cc/7SME-PA52]. The UK’s acceptance, however, contains a number of exceptions that make it very difficult to state a case against it. Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, INT’L CT. OF JUST. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/gb [https://perma.cc/DNY3-HYY7].

199. In San Francisco, the US delegate to the Charter negotiations, referring to the Purposes and Principles under the Charter, stated that these “constituted the highest rules of conduct” “and if the Security Council violated its principles and purposes it would be acting ultra vires.” See Akande, supra note 71, at 319 (emphasis added) (quoting U.N. Conference on International Organization, Thirteenth Meeting of Committee III, 379, U.N. Doc. 555.III/1/27 (Vol. XI) (May 23, 1945)). See also Application of the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Order, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 407, ¶¶ 100–04 (Sept. 13) (separate opinion by Lauterpacht, J.) (suggesting a Security Council resolution contrary to *jus cogens* would be void and UN Member States would be free to disregard it); HIEIECK, supra note 43, at 188 (emphasis added) (“While a treaty, such as the UN Charter, may be valid on its face, the *application* of certain treaty provisions, such as the exercise of the [permanent members’] discretionary rights . . . to impose binding decisions through Security Council resolutions under Articles 41 and/or 42, and to vote for *or veto* such resolutions under Article 27(3), may be invalid.
Before concluding, however, this article needs to articulate some caution about the advisability of pursuing these issues. International law operates in a very political arena. To some extent, during the Cold War, vetoes were simply used by the US and USSR to protect their own geopolitical interests, regardless of whether the UN’s Purposes and Principles or obligations under international law were being violated. One response, however, is that bad behavior does not justify future bad behavior. Yet, admittedly, for the General Assembly to request an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ on the questions suggested above could appear openly adversarial to the Russian Federation if attempted related to the invasion of Ukraine. Even other permanent members might perceive the raising of these issues as an indirect threat to their veto power—which at least some permanent members apparently believe is completely unlimited. Thus, such a route would need to be carefully considered, if the votes for obtaining an advisory opinion could even be obtained.

if it conflicts with a *jus cogens* norm.”); Orakhelashvili, *supra* note 71, at 68 (“Acts contrary to *jus cogens* are beyond the powers of an institution (*ultra vires*).”); Yiu, *supra* note 76, at 233 (“In the event of [Security Council] refusal to relinquish the veto in [the face of genocide or suspected genocide], any such veto will be *ultra vires*.†”); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, 86, ¶ 8 (Feb. 3) (separate opinion by Dugard, J.) (“States must deny recognition to a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm.”); DE WET, *supra* note 140, at 188 (“Where the execution of an obligation under the Charter such as a binding Security Council decision would result in a violation of a *jus cogens* norm, member states would be relieved from giving effect to the obligation in question.”); Hossain, *supra* note 43, at 97 (“The Security Council itself is . . . under an obligation to follow *[jus cogens]*,” otherwise it would be acting “*ultra vires*.”).

200. See *UN to Debate Security Council Permanent Member Veto Power*, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 19, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/19/un-to-debate-security-council-permanent-member-veto-power (explaining that since the first veto in 1946, Russia has exercised its veto 143 times, the United States 86 times, the United Kingdom 30 times, and China and France each 18 times) [https://perma.cc/K7EM-KZKU].

201. See *infra* text accompanying note 206.

202. The General Assembly votes by majority vote except for “important questions” which are by a two-thirds vote. U.N. Charter art. 18. While the permanent members technically have
A better starting point, one that would be far more neutral and apply to each of the permanent members, could be to seek an advisory opinion on whether veto use needs to be consistent with international law and obligations under the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{203} That could help rein in some of the permanent members’ more abusive vetoes—particularly regarding the permanent members that fail to commit not to use their vetoes in the face of genocide, war crimes, and crime against humanity.\textsuperscript{204} Twenty years after voluntary veto restraint was suggested\textsuperscript{205}—i.e., that the permanent members not use their veto in the face of such crimes—and with three holdout permanent members who show no indications of agreeing (the US, China, and Russia),\textsuperscript{206} the time is ripe to pursue some of these legal challenges. The passage of Liechtenstein’s resolution, ultimately co-sponsored by 83 UN Member States, to have mandatory debate within the General Assembly as to any veto cast\textsuperscript{207} provides an excellent opportunity only five votes within the UN General Assembly, their sway is far greater.

\textsuperscript{203} See supra note 124 (suggesting a formulation of a question from the General Assembly to the ICJ).


\textsuperscript{205} Veto restraint is suggested in the initial report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, which first articulate the doctrine of the responsibility to protect (“R2P”). See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 51 (2001).

\textsuperscript{206} The US, UK, China, and Russia have not signed the French/Mexican initiative. By contrast, France is a co-sponsor of the French/Mexican initiative and both the UK and France have signed the ACT Code of Conduct. French/Mexican Initiative Act, supra note 204; ACT Code of Conduct, supra note 204, annex II.

\textsuperscript{207} G.A. Res. 76/262 (Apr. 26, 2022) (“Standing mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto is cast in the Security Council.”).
to discuss such legality issues and build momentum towards having the General Assembly request an Advisory Opinion. In the meanwhile, states should make statements at the UN and other appropriate fora questioning the legality of veto use that is inconsistent with obligations under the UN Charter and international law; they could also pursue obtaining a General Assembly resolution recognizing that international law and the UN’s Purposes and Principles do provide outer limits to veto use.

IV. CONCLUSION

When the permanent members obtained the veto power in 1945, they were never granted unlimited power, because, as explored more extensively in the author’s book, certain limitations necessarily exist when operating under the UN Charter system. These obligations include not violating the UN’s Purposes and Principles or obligations of international law. The permanent members—whose status was created by the Charter—were never granted, nor could they be granted, the power to violate the UN’s Purposes and Principles, or obligations of international law, such as respect for jus cogens. Furthermore, even in voting, the permanent members are necessarily subject to these constraints as they never received any power under the UN Charter that was exempt from the need to act in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles, and obligations of international law.

The permanent members admittedly have not been voting as if any such obligations exist—with some freely vetoing, or threatening to veto, in the face of genocide, and freely vetoing in the face of war crimes and crimes against humanity. There most certainly are legality problems with such vetoes, as explained in detail in the author’s book. Moreover, other states are certainly not acquiescing in such behavior, but rather vociferously denouncing such vetoes. One explanation of why

208. See generally Trahan, supra note 14, ch. 4, at 142–259.
209. See Trahan, supra note 14, at 302.
210. See id. at 262.
legal challenges have not yet been brought is that some relevant legal obligations have only been recently articulated by the ICJ; for example, the due diligence obligation that all states parties to the Genocide Convention owe to prevent genocide, was explained in detail only in 2007 in the *Bosnia v. Serbia* case.\(^{212}\) It is against such an updated understanding of international law that one must measures contemporaneous veto use.\(^{213}\)

Some of these same legality issues that arise related to vetoes in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes—the vetoes that are the subject of the voluntary veto restraint initiatives\(^ {214}\) and the author’s book—also arise with a veto cast in the face of aggression. This is particularly true where the other members on the Security Council have a plan—a draft resolution to try to respond and ameliorate the situation and it has attracted at least nine votes (the number required for the resolution to pass absent the veto). Just such a plan existed with the Security Council resolution vetoed on February 25, 2022, by Russia.\(^ {215}\) That veto in the face of aggression helped to enable the status quo, the continuation of aggression, because it blocked a whole host of measures that other Council members were otherwise willing to undertake. While a Uniting for Peace resolution was passed\(^ {216}\) and the matter of Russia’s invasion was taken up by the General Assembly, even with the Uniting for Peace resolution, the General Assembly does not possess the powers that the Security Council does under the UN Charter.\(^ {217}\) Thus, the veto blocked the organ with the compulsory Chapter

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213. *See supra* note 30 and accompanying text.

214. *See supra* note 204 and accompanying text.


216. S.C. Res. 2623 (Feb. 27, 2022).

VII tools for responding to threats to the peace, tools that the General Assembly lacks.\textsuperscript{218}

The other reason to consider the author’s arguments about the legality of vetoes is that other avenues related to Security Council reform, at least regarding the veto, are pretty well exhausted. Because UN Charter amendments require the agreement of all permanent member states, one cannot modify or alter the veto power through a Charter amendment.\textsuperscript{219} Furthermore, as mentioned, states have spent over 20 years seeking voluntary commitments to rein in some of the more abusive veto practices, but have received no commitment from three permanent members.\textsuperscript{220} While additional UN Member States may still join these initiatives, it is unlikely that any of those three permanent members—China, Russia and the US—will do so; thus, those initiatives are not stopping abusive vetoes. Nor does Liechtenstein’s resolution, requiring mandatory debate within the General Assembly for each veto cast,\textsuperscript{221} stop abusive vetoes; it is extremely useful, but only in casting a spotlight on veto use. It is therefore time to consider a different approach, one based on the rule of law, specifically, what existing international law has to say about veto use, particularly, veto use in the face of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes (as advocated in the author’s book), but potentially also veto use in the face of aggression.

The ICJ is the right court to examine these issues. It is specifically empowered to receive requests for advisory opinions from the General Assembly. Moreover, there is some reason for optimism about a favorable decision. ICJ decisions and individual judges have been quite clear that no body under international law is above \textit{jus cogens} and that Security Council powers are constrained by the UN Charter, particularly the requirement of acting in accordance with the UN’s Purposes and Principles. If a Security Council resolution may not violate \textit{jus cogens} or the UN’s Purpose and Principles—as case law establishes\textsuperscript{222}—it is

\textsuperscript{218} See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 10-12.

\textsuperscript{219} U.N. Charter art. 108.

\textsuperscript{220} See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text. The U.S. has recently articulated important commitments to rein in its veto use.

\textsuperscript{221} G.A. Res. 76/262, ¶ 1 (Apr. 26, 2022).

\textsuperscript{222} See discussion supra Parts I.D.–II.A.
simply not logically consistent that these violations may be furthered (perpetuated and aided) through veto use.