Rising and Leading:
China with the G77 at the United Nations General Assembly

Tomoko Takahashi*

October 1, 2021

Abstract

How does China behave when its interests as a rising power contradict those of the developing countries, namely the Group of 77 (G77) members, in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)? Even with the realist premise that China could go its own way, a large coalition like G77 is valuable in the UNGA, where countries need cooperators to get their opinions voiced. This paper defines China’s rise in terms of its status identity between 2006 to 2008, and theorizes that, overall, China should remain silent but behave increasingly in line with the Global North, while they will rhetorically emphasize their alignment with the Global South, or the G77 to anchor their support. This theory is elaborated by four hypotheses that dissect the mechanism by pre/interim/post-rise periods, and a UNGA co-sponsorship dataset (1993-2016) built on several existing datasets is used to test the hypotheses regarding China’s silent behavior of authorship with regressions. Meanwhile, my original text analysis data of Chinese statements (2008-2011) is used for testing China’s rhetorical behavior with regressions. The analyses are supplemented with findings from UN documents, Chinese documents and newspapers. In sum, this paper seeks to contribute to research on coalition politics from a state-centric perspective with an emphasis on China studies.

Keywords: UN General Assembly, China, Group of 77 (G77), coalition politics, rising power, status identity, sponsorship behavior, text analysis

Notes for SSRN Readers:

1) This is an ongoing project that will be arranged to an empirical chapter of my doctoral dissertation that is tentatively entitled “Embedding State Autonomy in International

* Doctoral Student, Department of Advanced Social and International Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo. / Research Fellowship for Young Scientists (JC2), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan. (Email: tomoko-takahashi7@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp /
ORCiD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4173-9763.)
Institutions: China as a Rising Power in the United Nations General Assembly”, and I also hope to rearrange and publish parts of the project as stand-alone articles.

2) The former version of the manuscript (with very minor differences) was uploaded for my presentation at the 2021 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Panel: “Legislative Politics of the United Nations”), and comments from the panel are to be integrated in future versions of this project/draft.

1. Introduction

As China seeks to replace the “world order” that centers on American-led networks with an “international order” without “hegemony”, the United Nations (hereinafter the UN) remains to be highlighted as the main arena for multilateral diplomacy (Kawashima 2020). In line with China’s perceptions, it is also generally acknowledged that international institutions have become the arena for realpolitik bargaining (Caporaso 1992; Ikenberry 2011; Kahler 1993; Keohane 1990; Stephen and Zürn 2019).

Studying international institutions requires special attention to the fact that rational states have to maximize their benefits while abiding with the behavioral codes that regulate sovereignty (Krasner 1999; Kratochwil 2006). While principal-agent theory (Hawkins et al. 2006) and the literature on institutional authority (Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn et al. 2021) have elaborated the factors and mechanisms that contribute to the erosion of state autonomy, the horizontal factor of coalition politics within international institution can also impose restrictions to state autonomy (Bradley and Kelley 2008).

Coalition politics is especially interesting for cases with rising powers, because their interests can change, which in turn can alter their affinity with developing countries and give rise to rivalry with other rising powers or the incumbent hegemon.

For example, when China was participating at a conference on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), they referred to marine genetic resources as “common heritage of mankind” when sponsoring with the Group of 77 (hereinafter G77) as developing countries, but switched to the term “common well-being of humankind” when they were not voicing their opinions with the G77 (Takahashi 2019). In other words, they emphasized the public nature of such resources and went against the idea that they can be exploited by the developed countries with the technologies to do so, while they also showed some understanding to the freedom of the high seas, which in turn allows them to explore such resources ahead of others as a rising power.
The abovementioned example is a rhetorical representation of the rising power’s ambiguous attitude, but how does it look like at a systematic level? When the interests of China shift from those of the developing countries to those of the developed countries, do they bluntly change their opinions? Even under the realistic premise that rising powers can go their own way, they may not want to completely abandon their longtime friends from the G77, because the UN General Assembly (hereinafter UNGA) operates on a one-country-one-vote rule, where the number of supporters matter.

2. Literature Review
2.1 Literature on Coalition Politics
Coalition politics within international institutions have been explored by researchers with a gradation of scope conditions; (1) an inter-coalition scope that speaks to the fate of the liberal international order as a whole, (2) an intra-coalition scope with interest in the cohesion of specific clusters of countries, and (3) a state-centric scope that centers on its foreign policy dynamics.

As to the first scope, various focal points, such as ideology as shortcuts for policy standpoint interpretation (Voeten 2021), domestic regime type regarding democratic/un-democratic countries (Finke 2021), and the clustering of countries that seek to remain inconspicuous to maintain future cooperation (Takahashi 2020) have been probed into. These studies emphasize the relation of inter-coalitions, and Kahler (2013) has proposed causal hypotheses about the extent to which rising powers may or may not alter global governance.

The second type of research that studies the cohesion of specific clusters of states has covered the Commonwealth (Baert and Shaw 2014), the G7 and the G20 (Brandi 2019), and the G77 (Iida 1988), and BRICS, or Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Dijkhuizen and Onderco 2019; Ferdinand 2014), as the proxy for rising powers. As can be seen, this type of research can speak to the order debates by focusing on the extent to which certain camps of the world align amongst themselves, but they are more interested in the static snapshots of certain time periods rather than change.

Finally, foreign policy dynamics are explored by researchers that specialize in different countries and regions. For example, a UNGA behavioral study on Brazil and South Africa reveals the tension between being a regional power and rising power at the global level (Mesquita and Seabra 2020), and another study that includes the investigation
of UNGA and United Nations Security Council (hereinafter UNSC) behavior of Italy reveals how they pursued their political status under the dynamics of American-led order and EU politics (Monteleone 2019). Albeit in the field of political theory, the cohesion of the African region in contrast to state autonomy and global marginalization (Getachew 2019) triggers a same line of thought. In contrast to the first two types of research that take a bird’s-eye-view approach, zooming into specific countries and regions enables scrutiny into the specific interests of multilateral actors, which in turn makes it possible to hypothesize the underlying logic of change over time.

Given the international and regional order debates initiated by the first two trends and the concrete interest-driven theories in the third, this paper scrutinizes China in the third trend to further understand what consequences the alleged “challenger” to the liberal international order brings to the fore (Schweller and Pu 2011).

China’s behavior on coalition politics within international institutions have barely been investigated, although the third line of thought has been explored regarding its diplomacy in general. A close line of thought can be seen in Kida (1986), who sought to objectively uncover Chinese foreign policy vis-à-vis different countries and regions by hand-coding all the bilateral treaties over time. This paper follows Kida (1986)’s approach in carefully interpreting seemingly universal terms in the eyes of China.

2.2 Literature on China and International Institutions

Needless to say, China has been one of the main protagonists in international institutional studies, albeit not specifically on coalition politics within the institutions. The initial theme was on whether and how China “socializes” into multilateralism (Johnston 2008; Kim 1979; Lanteigne 2008), until the need to comprehend China’s multilateralism as their strategic choice (Moore 2008) was pointed out.

In line with the rationalist strand in institutional studies in general (Lipsky 2017), China’s production and maintenance of regimes have been theorized either regarding its outside options and China’s indispensability for other major powers (Kastner et al. 2019; Kastner et al. 2020), or China’s rise in terms of military, economic and soft-power and the diversification of Chinese decision-makers on foreign policies (Yoshikawa 2017). This strand of literature parallels Ikenberry (2006)’s work on the founding of international institutions from an American-perspective, and share the idea that focus on China brings new ideas.
As Kastner et al. (2019:25) point out in their book, the rationalist theorization has been done on the “second-order cooperation” problem (“whether or not the rising state contributes to the production and maintenance of a regime”) and the “first-order cooperation” problem (“whether or not the rising state complies with a regime”) has been left for future research. Looking into China’s coalition politics within the UNGA should also speak to the “first-order cooperation” problem in this strand of research.

3. Research Question and Research Design

The research question of this paper is; how does China behave when its interests as a rising power contradict those of the developing countries, namely the G77, as its longtime alignment counterparts in the UNGA?

3.1 Group of 77 as the “Developing Countries”

What counts as “developing countries” hinges on the perception of the country in question. China’s State Council reflects on their sixty years of diplomacy vis-à-vis the “developing countries” as of 2010, and state that “developing states are a cluster of nation states that emerged in the process of world decolonization and have come to develop, have constituted an important element of the international system, and are also an important momentum that pushes for change in the international system” (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Information Office 2010). The narrative also reveals that the status of “developing” is linked to their colonial past, which connects to anti-hegemonic spirits, and this has united the countries in the form of Asian-African Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement (hereinafter NAM), and the G77.

With this list of “developing countries”, and aside from the regional caucus groups from the Asian and African states, NAM and G77 are the main coalitions seen in the UNGA. However, this paper proxies “developing countries” with G77, because China rarely co-sponsors with NAM according to a survey of the drafts from the 63rd to 66th UNGA sessions. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially emphasizes their cooperation with and support to the G77 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021a), which is in contrast to the lack of such agenda regarding NAM in both official explanations and their speech at a NAM summit conference (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021b).
3.2 China’s Rise as Status Identity and the Scope Condition of this Paper

When this paper says China’s “rise”, it is theoretically speaking about the moment when GDP growth has led to the conception of Chinese foreign policy around the notion that they are outgrowing the label of a developing country. “Foreign policy” in this definition refers to foreign policy in general, and it is exactly due to the complexity of multilateral coalition politics that there may be a temporal lag for China to actually start behaving as a rising power within the UNGA. Needless to say, this theoretical moment is constantly debated in China studies.

As Kastner et al. (2019: 47-62) elaborates in their Third Chapter, China’s GDP growth has started since their economic reform in 1978, and Deng Xiaoping pursued “taoguangyanghui”, a low-profile diplomatic strategy to prioritize development and avoid being entangled in complex international politics. After some pragmatic adjustments to the strategy and move towards multilateralism have been made around the mid-1990s1, “[t]wo recent events have led China’s leaders to reconsider the country’s place in the global order”, namely the “global financial crisis that began in 2008” and “the move by the US government, under the Obama administration, to ‘rebalance’ or ‘pivot’ to Asia” (Kastner et al. 2019: 60). At the same time, the wordings and nuance of the “taoguangyanghui” strategy is said to have been adjusted starting from 2006 until the end of 2008 (Kawashima 2012; Kawashima 2017), and 2006 is another key year when they officially added “national sovereignty and security” to “economic development” as their “national interest” (Aoyama 2016: 117). In sum, it is safe to say that somewhere between 2006 to 2008 was the timing when China’s rise in the sense of status identity change occurred.

In line with the definition of “rise”, the period from 2006 to 2008, which consists the “interim” years of President Hu Jintao’s era (2002-2012), is taken as the years of rise, because it is a process that presumably requires time and is also contested in China studies.

The “pre-rise” eras and “post-rise” eras are taken loosely, so long as they fit

---

1 China started to realize the need to adjust the concept of “taoguangyanghui” and engage in multilateralism for the “New Security Concept” around 1996, when Chinese security behavior in the South China Sea began to be contested as a “threat” especially by its Southeast Asian neighbors (Foot 2006; Takagi 2003; Yahuda 2003). In contrast to the 1996 turn being a pragmatic shift to multilateralism (Finkelstein 2001) than fundamental to its status identity, scholars agree that the next turn between 2006 to 2008 was a serious one.
between 1991 and the current time period\textsuperscript{2}. This is due to several reasons. Firstly, availability of data from the specific time periods were taken into account. Secondly, the starting point was set as such because the very first authorship of a “G77 and China” statement paper at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development happened in 1991 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021a).

3.3 Research Design

As to the research design, this paper introduces a theory and four hypotheses to answer the research question. After introducing the UNGA co-sponsorship data from 1993 to 2016 that combine the existing datasets by Finke (2020) and Mesquita and Seabra (2020), and a text-analysis data that I constructed from all the Chinese statements made regarding the resolutions upon its adoption from the 63\textsuperscript{rd} to 65\textsuperscript{th} sessions, the paper tests the four hypotheses quantitatively and qualitatively. Explanations on the UNGA co-sponsorship and text-analysis data are elaborated in due course. As to the qualitative analysis, this paper analyzes statements and newspapers related to the UN and China either in English or in Chinese. All cited quotes from Chinese texts are translated by the author of this paper.

The reason for taking up the UNGA is two-fold. Firstly, UNGA is one of the most geographically universal arenas in the UN that allows full participation of the developing countries, which is in contrast to exclusive arenas such as the UNSC that only includes fifteen permanent and non-permanent members. In order to see the relation of China vis-à-vis its G77 friends, the members have to be allowed to fully participate in the arena in the first place.

Secondly, the UNGA serves as a hard case to see whether rising power politics is in play. Article 12 of the UN Charter stipulates that it is the UNSC that addresses sensitive security issues (United Nations Charter), and it has become customary that many UNGA drafts in specific committees are initiated by the “G77+China” (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations 2017). At first sight, it may seem that UNGA is a friendly environment for the cooperation among China and the developing countries.

\textsuperscript{2} Another way to do this may be to narrow the scope to the UNGA sessions during President Hu Jintao’s era, namely the 57\textsuperscript{th} session (2002-2003) to the 66\textsuperscript{th} (2011-2012), because leadership change may lead to different foreign policies including those on the UNGA.
However, the aim of this paper is to show that even the UNGA sees state-centric interests in operation.

4. Assumption: China’s Coalition with G77

Before answering how China behaves when its interests as a rising power contradict those of the G77, to what extent have they actually been aligned with the G77 before its rise between 1991 to 2005?

As to the official status of China vis-à-vis the G77, despite being invited to the group right after it “replaced” the Republic of China, or Taiwan, with UNGA resolution 2758 in October 1971, China “declined on the official pretext that she could be more effective in helping the causes of the Third World by working outside rather than inside the Group” (Kim 1979: 256-257). This situation continues until today, as the official website of G77 includes China in their membership list (The Group of 77 at the United Nations (G77) Website) while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs denies their membership and emphasizes that they “have continuously supported its [G77’s] just claims and reasonable requirements, and have maintained good cooperative relationship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021a).

However, as mentioned above, China’s cooperation with G77 started in the form of co-authoring political statements in 1991 in a UN conference, and China claims to have donated 20,000 US dollars every year to G77 starting from 1994, and increased the amount to 40,000 US dollars every year from 2004 (Li 2010).

In line with such budgetary contributions, China describes their coalition politics in the UNGA as follows. “G77 conducts a group of foreign minister’s meetings and ministerial level meetings dedicated to discussing one or several important issues on the night before (or at the beginning of) the UNGA”, where decisions are made by consensus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021a). Although this explanation is not clear as to whether China joins these pre-UNGA coordination meetings, it is seen as a custom that the G77 and China “coordinates on all Second and Fifth Committee issues as well as some Third Committee and Plenary items relating to economic issues and development” (Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations 2017: 123). Although from the 63rd meeting in 2009, Sudan alludes to the pre-coordination between G77 and China by saying “[m]y delegation associates itself with the statements to be made by the representative of Antigua and Barbuda on behalf of the Group of 77 and
China” (A/63/PV.26: 25, emphasis made by author). As will be elaborated later on, Chinese Foreign Minister speeches during the pre-rise period also directly points to the importance of coordination in international conferences.

In sum, China’s coalition with the G77 in the UNGA is clearly existent during the pre-rise era, which “strengthens the solidarity and cooperation of developing countries within the realm of international economy, promotes the establishment of a new international economic order, and promotes the economic and social development of the developing countries” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2021a).

5. Theory and Hypothesis

The theory of this paper contends that China’s rise brings dilemma to China itself within the UNGA; their interests change in accordance to their rise, which in turn brings clashes with the G77 that have been their coalition partner in the pre-rise era. Although it is ultimately up to China to decide whom to cooperate with under new circumstances, their historical coalition with the developing countries is something that they cannot let go of easily. Below is the elaboration of the theory and its corresponding hypotheses.

5.1 China on Respect for Sovereignty and Development

Thinking in accordance with Finke (2021)’s categorization of five UNGA topics, “social/health/human rights”, “climate/environment”, “regional/religious/ethnic conflict”, “organized crime”, and “national security/disarmament”, the opinions of G77 and China had not diverged on most issues except for security issues, because of Deng Xiaoping’s idea of taoguangyanghui (Kawashima 2012). In other words, China’s interest was to pursue a low-profile foreign policy including that on global governance to avoid getting entangled in international politics and pursue development throughout the Jian Zemin era until mid-Hu Jintao era (Kawashima 2012).

Two narratives stood out to pursue such low-profile policy (Foot 2001); (i) the principles of non-interference and respect of sovereignty and (ii) development. While it is obvious that the latter was upheld because China was literally a developing country, and it made sense to amplify their voices with other states, the former may need some explanation.
Peterson (2006: 84) assesses states’ UNGA behavior in securing adoptions of their proposals during the focal period of this research, and explains that “[d]elegations in the Third World majority typically seek endorsement from their regional group, and then build outward to the rest of the G-77 because traditions of mutual deference mean the whole group is unlikely to take up something opposed by a majority in the region”. This not only applies to China, but partly originates in Chinese ideas in relation to the Bandung Conference (Brazinsky 2017; Kim 1979). In other words, while (i) stems from their substantive anti-hegemonic spirit, it is also an effective and pragmatic way to maintain room for their voice in coalition politics.

To what extent will such Chinese interests change in relation to those of the Global South? Since any great power needs supporters to get their voice on the agenda, having reliable coalitions, and especially a large coalition like G77, is an asset for China. Maintaining coalitions comes at costs, as in the classical tit-for-tat theory by Axelrod (1984). In other words, China needs to have G77 at least perceive that China has “cooperated with” them regarding both focal points.

Meanwhile, it is also true that they cannot completely fake their intentions, especially when such narratives are completely against their interests. However, the principle of non-interference is (i) a legitimation term also for the Communist government on their domestic front that they will not let go of easily, (ii) economic rise coupled with non-interference works well for China, and (iii) it is such a blurry term that is open for divergent interpretations. As to developmental issues, even if China is no longer in need of assistance, they have adopted the win-win framework to incorporate aid as economic schemes for themselves.

In sum, China should still find it beneficial to advocate for the two long-held focal points, mainly to secure coalition in the UNGA. Therefore, the first hypothesis is as follows.

**Hypothesis 1: Even after China’s rise, China’s emphasis on the respect for sovereignty and development should not decrease.**

---

3 Although “responsibility to protect (R2P)” peacekeeping missions can trigger controversy over this principle, China does not take up the issue in the UNGA at least within the 63th to 66th sessions analyzed, and the website of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN categorizes peacekeeping under the banner of “Comprehensive issues at the UNSC” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Website)).
5.2 China on Environment

Aside from the two traditional narratives, China as a rising power may find new agenda that contradicts the opinions of developing countries. One potential case is where China shifts along the North-South divide regarding environmental regulation. It is well known that, while the Global North calls for global solidarity in environmental regulation, the Global South asserts that the developed countries have accumulated environmental footprints and should shoulder the burden of environmental regulation. This is further amplified with the claim on development that the Global South should be given further opportunities to develop, and the example from the introduction fits this situation.

Environmental regulation consequences for Chinese interests are extremely difficult to evaluate, but environmental disasters and problems are events that can trigger social unrest and discontent with the government (Economy 2007). This can incentivize China to push for environmental regulation, and Chen (2017) assesses the Paris Accord on Climate Change to have concluded its negotiations thanks to the cooperation between China and the United States. In other words, China has become the mediator between the Global South and North at the Paris Accord negotiations at the latest. To hypothesize, China should seek to appear as being considerate about the developmental needs of the Global South to enable drafts on environments, which actually clash with their interests.

Hypothesis 2: Along with China’s rise, they should increasingly behave in line with the Global North on environmental issues, while still emphasizing the importance of development

5.3 China on Security Issues

As alluded to earlier, security was the exception to the concordance of China-Global-South interests even before China’s rise. Their first nuclear experiment was conducted successfully as early as in 1964, and they acceded the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in March 1992 as a “recognized” nuclear state (Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations (Website)). When it comes to nuclear power that requires high technology, it becomes a question of have and have-nots, with most of the developing countries marginalized as the latter. Such privileged status is also in parallel to their permanent seat at the UNSC.
Although China may set such topics aside for the UNSC to discuss without the presence of G77, China itself acknowledges that the First Committee of the UNGA discusses “Disarmament and Arms Control” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Website)). Furthermore, Jin (2016: 31) explains that the First Committee is the “one and only main committee” in the UNGA that has acquired the rights to have its note verbale recorded, and alludes to its importance.

In such cases, China should find it uncomfortable to behave as a privileged country in the eyes of other states, especially while emphasizing its role as a leader of the Global South in the same arena. Therefore, China should play it cool and avoid being verbose about their real interests, such as by avoiding making statements or quietly voting in favor of the privileged. This will see no change before and after China’s rise.

_Hypothesis 3: Regardless of China’s rise, China will not emphasize their position in security issues, and quietly pursue their interests._

### 5.4 Aggregation and Summary of the Hypotheses

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses of this section and also refers to a final hypothesis on the aggregate behavior of China at the UNGA. Given the three hypotheses, among which Hypothesis 2 is the only one that includes contradiction with the interests of the Global South, the following can be said; (i) China’s emphasis on the respect for sovereignty and development will increase with its rise (given that there is no change in H1 but an increase in H2), while they remain quiet about security issues regardless of its rise (due to H3). In contrast to their emphasis on issues relevant to the Global South, (ii) they will quietly pursue an increasing amount of interest-driven behavior on environmental regulation (due to H2), and a constant amount of behavior on security related issues (due to H3). All in all, aside from silent behavior that may not alter the perceptions of other states, China will be more eloquent about Global-South related matters in order to secure future cooperation counterparts (Takahashi 2020). In a nutshell, Hypothesis 4 is as follows.

_Hypothesis 4: Along with China’s rise, China will emphasize their alignment with the Global South in contrast to their silent behavior that increasingly aligns with the Global North._

| Table 1: Summary of the Hypotheses of This Paper |  
|--------------------------------------------------|---|
H1 | Even after China’s rise, China’s emphasis on the respect for sovereignty and development should not decrease.
---|---
H2 | Along with China’s rise, they should increasingly behave in line with the Global North on environmental issues, while still emphasizing the importance of development.
---|---
H3 | Regardless of China’s rise, China will not emphasize their position in security issues, and quietly pursue their interests.
---|---
H4 | Along with China’s rise, China will emphasize their alignment with the Global South in contrast to their silent behavior that increasingly aligns with the Global North.

### 6. Operationalization of Variables with UNGA Co-Sponsorship Dataset and the Text-Analysis Data

As alluded to in the research design, the UNGA Co-Sponsorship dataset that builds on two existing datasets and a separate text-analysis data was built to test the hypotheses along with the relevant documents.

When the hypotheses mention China’s “emphasis” (see underlined parts of H1~H4), the extent to which they articulate their affinity to maintain their coalition with the G77 matter. This is in contrast to how they “behave” or “quietly/ silently” pursue their interests (see underlined parts of H2, H3 and H4), as these concepts point to the extent to which they actually push towards the adoption of their preferred drafts. Below are detailed explanations of the tests for “silent” behavior and “emphasis” behavior.

#### 6.1 The Silent Behavior of China

China’s silent behavior is proxied by Chinese authorship[^4] in the respective drafts, which is due to two reasons. Firstly, co-sponsorship enables the capturing of all policy preferences within the UNGA session. Although voting is an explicit way to measure policy preferences of states, at least 75% of the resolutions in the UNGA sessions are being adopted without a vote regarding the sessions years that I am interested in (Peterson 2006: 74-79), and therefore looking only at voting will bias the pool of measurements on state behavior towards issues that are especially controversial. Since the aim of this paper is to

[^4]: Finke (2020)’s data refers to the act of joining (co-)sponsorship as “authorship”. This term is used interchangeably in this paper as well.
look at the dynamic change of relations among China and the G77 members, it is desirable to capture the subtle differences of attitudes among states even when they end up being adopted without a vote. Secondly, sponsorship can proxy directional intentions of states vis-à-vis other members to some extent (Mesquita and Seabra 2020; Peterson 2006) compared to the final decisions with consensus or voting that reflects the aggregation of states’ interactions.

In order to see whether Chinese authorship, or silent behavior, aligned with those of the Global North or the South, this paper ran regressions to see whether the increase of G77 member ratio within the drafts’ co-sponsorship members enhanced the possibility of Chinese authorship with some control variables that are explained in due course. The UNGA Co-Sponsorship Dataset was used, and because it covers the years from 1993 to 2016, regression was respectively conducted for the following eras to compare the changes in the effects; the pre-rise era (1993-2005), interim era (2006-2008), and the post-rise era (2009-2016) for Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 as in Table 2.

### Table 2: Summary of the Hypotheses, the Corresponding Methods and Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Row: Hypothesis/Column: Type of Behavior</th>
<th>Rhetorical Behavior</th>
<th>Silent Behavior (Authorship)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>TA (comparison of interim/post-rise) + QA (pre-rise)</td>
<td>N/A (not included in the hypothesis)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>QA (pre/interim/post-rise)</td>
<td>UNGA-CD (pre/interim/post-rise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>QA (pre/interim/post-rise)</td>
<td>UNGA-CD (pre/interim/post-rise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>TA from H1 (interim/post-rise) + QA (pre-rise)</td>
<td>UNGA-CD (pre/interim/post-rise)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNGA-CD= UNGA co-sponsorship data

---

5 The ideal is to take into account whether states sponsored from the outset or became subsequent sponsors at revision or addendum drafts (Mesquita and Seabra 2020).
6.2 UNGA Co-Sponsorship Data

UNGA co-sponsorship data has been compiled by using two earlier datasets. Firstly, Finke (2020) compiled a dataset with “country-draft” as its unit of analysis and coded whether respective states authored or not authored each draft from 1993 to 2016. Due to Finke (2021)’s interest into the relation of state regimes and co-authorship, Finke (2020)’s data also included whether the state was democratic or autocratic, which he “operationalize by using the Polyarchy Index provided by the V-Dem project” (Finke 2021: 9). Another prominent feature is that UNGA draft topics are modeled by Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) algorithm, and are categorized into the five topics, “social/health/human rights”, “climate/environment”, “regional/religious/ethnic conflict”, “organized crime”, and “national security/disarmament” (Finke 2021: 10-11) as alluded to earlier.

In addition to this dataset, the research design of this paper requires information on whether the respective authors of the drafts were G77 members. Since G77 member trajectory by year is listed by Mesquita and Seabra (2020), I coded whether the state was a member with 1s (yes) and 0s (no). Furthermore, control variables required information on whether each state recognized Taiwan instead of China in respective years, and therefore I coded them with 1s and 0s as well. Finally, I calculated the ratio of G77 members and Taiwan recognizers for each draft. In summarizing the data from “country-draft” to those by “drafts”, I also added Chinese GDP for that year to operationalize as a control variable. In sum, the “country-draft” dataset consisted of 1,980,172 observations and 20 variables.

6.3 The Rhetorical Behavior of China

Regarding China’s emphasis on specific topics to appeal to the G77, whatever is clearly articulated by China may count as such behavior. One of the most conspicuous behavior they can adopt in the UNGA is to make statements, and therefore, this paper used the text-analysis data that compiles Chinese statements made in the adoption of draft resolutions to check their contents.

In order to proxy whether it actually appealed to the G77 members, regressions were run to see whether reference to specific contents increased or decreased the possibility of having more G77 members in co-sponsorship peers. Furthermore, because China may
not concentrate its efforts on appealing to the G77 when G77 members were just random members in co-sponsoring the draft resolution in question (regardless of whether China also authored). I ran another set of regressions to see if reference to specific contents increase or decrease the occurrence of group co-sponsorship as “G77 and China” (regardless of whether there are other additional co-authors).

Since the text-analysis data included the years from 2008 to 2011 (namely from the 63rd to the 65th session), regressions could only be run for the interim and post-rise eras for comparison of the effects. Therefore, additional qualitative analysis was conducted to complement the pre-rise eras. As to the additional materials for qualitative analysis, Chinese official speeches and newspapers, as well as relevant documents from the UN and G77 were analyzed.

6.4 Text Analysis Data of Chinese Statements

I conducted text analysis on Chinese statements being made from the 63rd to 65th sessions in the UNGA. Firstly, I identified the corresponding verbatim records of the UNGA to check whether China made any statements upon the adoption of the draft, regardless of whether this was done with or without a vote. I did not differentiate by the reason of the statement, such as by whether the statement was made in explanation of the vote or as an introduction to their sponsored draft (Peterson 2006). This is because any state could voice whatever they want to in their given time.

Identification of verbatim records with Warntjen (2016)’s data or the UNGA official list (Dag Hammarskjöld Library) did not suffice, since the listed verbatim records only refer to the moment when the draft was adopted, but discussions can be continued from former or even past plenary meetings in the same session. Therefore, I checked whether the President of the plenary mentioned whether and which of the former plenaries were relevant to the draft, and also made sure that overarching statements made per agenda items were reflected in all the drafts that were covered.

The codes were as follows; firstly, I did pilot coding to see if I could capture the expansion and contraction of “state autonomy” (Bradley and Kelley 2008) regarding specific issues, because coalition politics of China and G77 is highly relevant to the notion of “respect of sovereignty”, as explained above.

The codes ended up being (i) “humanitarian/ human rights”, in that the betterment of situations for the sake of individuals regardless of their affiliation was emphasized,
which was in contrast to (ii) “order” that called for stability of the society, with a nuance to overriding the issue of justice at an individual level. In parallel to this, the procedural point on (iii) “transnationalism” was captured as to whether they emphasize the cooperation with units anything other than the state or even the subordination of states to other institutions (be it international organizations, non-governmental organizations, citizens, international law and so forth), which was in contrast to (iv) “sovereignty”, that emphasized the respect of sovereignty and state ownership of its jurisdictions, territories and people. Thirdly, substantial recommendations on (v) the “governance of the international organizations” was captured, to see if they proposed reform for international organizations, and one example would be the favorite call for “democratic international relations” by China. In parallel to this, (vi) recommendation for “governance of domestic issues” was also captured, which included an interesting case where China called for “democracy” in Afghanistan. Other codes were (vii) “arms”, (viii) “economic activities”, (ix) “environment” with respective gradations as to whether they regulated or de-regulated the activities, and (x) “development”, in terms of whether it was supported and/or technological/financial aid was called for in the implementation of the draft.

Needless to say, the terms are China-centric interpretations for the sake of my theory, and they needed to be hand-coded, since the same wording of “human rights” can refer to completely different meanings depending on the context in the case of Chinese statements. The current text analysis addresses 137 verbatim records with Chinese statements, and approximately 2200 coding was done according to the categorization.

Just to give an idea of the 63rd to the 65th sessions in which the abovementioned coding was conducted, I used the UNGA co-sponsorship data from the same period with 154,008 observations (draft-state as the unit of analysis) to see whether states could be clustered by sponsorship patterns. Below are the reduced graphs of the sponsorship behavior of 189 states in respective sessions. States with similar co-sponsorship patterns in terms of structural equivalence are clustered by blockmodeling, and China belongs to Block 2 with developing countries at all times. Block 1 mainly consists of the so-called Western countries, Block 3 contains Russia and its close allies, and the 63rd period was better organized with the micro states being teased out as another group.
Figure 1: Cluster of (Co-)Sponsorship Members in the 63rd, 64th and 65th Sessions at the UNGA (from left to right)

7. Empirical Analyses

7.1 Empirical Analysis for Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 stated that China still emphasizes the respect for sovereignty and development after its rise vis-à-vis the G77 members.

Firstly, I ran a regression analysis with the text-analysis data to see whether an emphasis on any of the coded topics led to an increase or decrease of the probability that China co-authors with a higher ratio of G77 members, which is separate from co-sponsorship as a group. The exact same regression analysis was conducted for the interim period (Model 1) and for the post-rise period (Model 2). If Hypothesis 1 held true, topics related to the respect of sovereignty and development should enhance the possibility of having more G77 authors in the sponsoring cohort, and the trend should not change between Models 1 and 2. Table 3 summarizes the results.

Interestingly, Model 1 did not yield any statistical significance, indicating no relationship between China’s emphasis on the key topics and its appeal to the G77 authors. Meanwhile, Model 2 shows that humanitarian topics and order-related topics respectively boosted the possibility of having another G77 co-sponsor by 1%.

To begin with, the two results indicate that China’s appeal to G77 members with their rhetoric began after its rise, although the situations of the pre-rise and interim eras require further data collection. Secondly, as in the coding rule, the topic on “humanitarian/human rights” issues emphasizes the centrality and betterment of individuals regardless of
their affiliations, while the topic on “order” prioritizes stability and order over justice at an individual level. Therefore, the result from the “order” topic is in line with the hypothesis about respect of sovereignty, while the result on “humanitarian/human rights” topic may allude to the opposite of the respect of sovereignty in this context. Inferring from the actual texts, China often pairs sugar-coated rhetoric on the centrality of people with their essential claim about the respect for sovereignty, which may explain the result.

While Models 1 and 2 focus on the ratio of G77 members among the co-sponsors regardless of group sponsorship, it may be that China concentrates its efforts on appealing to the G77 only when they are sponsoring together as a group. Therefore, I examined whether Chinese reference to specific topics triggers increase or decrease in the possibility of co-sponsorship that includes “G77 and China” as a group. Binary logistic regression was conducted for the interim (Model 3) and post-rise (Model 4) periods.

In parallel to Models 1 and 2, if Hypothesis 1 held true, topics related to the respect for sovereignty and development should enhance the possibility of seeing more co-authorship as “G77 and China”, and the trend should not change between Models 3 and 4. Meanwhile, the effects may be larger in Models 3 and 4 compared to Models 1 and 2, if China stresses its relation with the G77 in group co-sponsorship occasions rather than in cases where they only end up having more G77 members within the co-sponsors.

Result of Model 3 echoed Model 1 in that no relation was shown during the interim period. However, Model 4 showed that emphasis on “development” boosted the possibility for group co-sponsorship, while emphasis on “governance of domestic issues”, “governance of international organizations” and “order” respectively gave a decrease in the possibility.

Again, the two results indicate that China’s appeal/ negative appeal to G77 members with their rhetoric began after its rise, although the situation before and between its rise requires further data collection. As to the topic contents in Model 4, it is intuitive that “development” enhances group co-sponsorship, as well as “governance on domestic issues”, the opposite of the respect of sovereignty, giving negative effects for group co-sponsorship. As to “governance of international organizations”, China often calls for “democratic” international relations by giving voice to the Global South, which should boost G77 support, but the result is the opposite as well as with the topic “order”.

Table 3: Results of Regressions in Models 1~4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Results of Regressions in Models 1~4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Interim)</td>
<td>(post)</td>
<td>(Interim)</td>
<td>(post)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>G77AuthorRatio</td>
<td>G77AuthorRatio</td>
<td>G77ChinaSum</td>
<td>G77ChinaSum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>0.06 ***</td>
<td>0.03 ***</td>
<td>0.14 *</td>
<td>0.52 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_sov.sovereignty</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_sov.transnational</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_dev.support</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.05 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_demogov</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.15 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_IOgov</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.15 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_humanitarian</td>
<td>0.01 ***</td>
<td>0.01 ***</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sum_order</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01 *</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.08 *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R^2</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>31.73</td>
<td>118.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>48.94</td>
<td>142.31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-6.87</td>
<td>-50.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>16.05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05
Although it is only the interim and post-rise eras where the UNGA statement behavior could be compared, China has definitely “emphasized” their respect of sovereignty and development in diverse occasions vis-à-vis the G77 members during the pre-rise eras as well. For example, President Hu Jintao had an informal meeting with Algerian, Brazilian and Malaysian leaders upon the North-South Dialogue held at Lausanne in June 2004 to speak about solidarity over developmental issues, and reassured them that “no matter how the international situation changes, China will always stand firmly with the large number of developing countries” (Li 2003). This alludes to their anticipation as early as the pre-rise era that China may come to a phase where its interests diverge from those of the developing countries, but also to the fact that they were willing to keep its ties with them from the outset.

Six years later, China in the post-rise era posted a reflection on its diplomacy with the developing countries to confirm their resolve with a slightly different nuance; “China will always be on the side of the Third World, but will never be the head”, while citing Deng Xiaoping’s words on how China refused to be the head even when asked to do so by some developing countries to counter the “pressure” from the West in the 1980s (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Information Office 2010).

In contrast to casually reassuring their solidarity with an emphasis on common development in the interim era, the 2010 wordings not only speak about solidarity but also emphasize that their relation is on an equal basis. Such emphasis on equality ties back to the spirit of anti-hegemonism shared by the Third World, and this again reflects China’s accurate understanding of what to appeal to the G77 countries.

7.2 Empirical Analysis for Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 expected that China should increasingly behave in line with the Global North on environmental issues, while still emphasizing the importance of development. The first half of the hypothesis was tested by the UNGA Co-Sponsorship dataset. Topic on environment was teased out by filtering out “Topic 2” according to Finke (2020; 2021)’s definition, and I ran regressions on whether having more G77 members in the co-sponsorship cohort made any changes to the possibility of China joining sponsorship on the draft. Model 5, 6 and 7 respectively did the same on the “pre-rise” (1993-2005), “interim” (2006-2008), and “post-rise” (2009-2016) periods, while Model 8 shows the overall trend over time. Several control variables were used; (i) having more Taiwan
recognizers in the co-sponsorship members may render it unfavorable for China, (ii) having more authoritarian regimes in the co-sponsorship members may render it favorable for China, (iii) higher GDP may enable China to buy in co-sponsorship (Carter and Stone 2015), and (iv) specific annual events may render their Choice of sponsoring.

The former half of Hypothesis 2 should be proved by having less positive effect of G77 ratio on Chinese sponsorship over time, in the sequence of Model 5, 6 and 7. The end result was that China did not even have positive effects for the “pre-rise” era, and having more G77 members in the co-sponsors made China more unlikely to author the draft. This was also true for Model 7, and the negative effect got stronger compared to Model 5, which is in line with the hypothesis. However, Model 6 saw no relation with G77 membership.

As to the control variables, all models showed a statistically significant effect with authoritarian regime ratio. This is left for future studies, since the relation between G77 and authoritarian regimes is complex.

Table 4: Results of Regressions in Models 5~8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>Pre Author</td>
<td>Interim Author</td>
<td>Post Author</td>
<td>N/A(Overall) Author</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>-172.41 *</td>
<td>-1066.50</td>
<td>1184.76</td>
<td>-93.22 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(82.35)</td>
<td>(1908.90)</td>
<td>(1690.24)</td>
<td>(21.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g77_author_ratio</td>
<td>-6.17 ***</td>
<td>-4.05</td>
<td>-13.64 ***</td>
<td>-6.17 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.25)</td>
<td>(3.49)</td>
<td>(2.47)</td>
<td>(0.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taiwan_author_ratio</td>
<td>-5.16</td>
<td>-5.57</td>
<td>20.79 *</td>
<td>-3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.48)</td>
<td>(10.02)</td>
<td>(8.00)</td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian_ratio</td>
<td>14.16 ***</td>
<td>11.16 *</td>
<td>22.23 ***</td>
<td>13.51 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(4.21)</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chinaGDP</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>0.09 *</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.05 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>(0.85)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As to the latter half of Hypothesis 2, the number of cases in the text analysis data remain insufficient to conduct a quantitative analysis. However, G77 and Chinese documents allude to the situation.

The Sao Paolo Declaration from June 2004, that fits in the pre-rise period, alludes to the position of G77 on environmental issues. The term “environment” cannot be found in the document, while “sustainable development” is barely referred to for five times in a seven-page document with emphasis on “development” (Mourad ed. 2015: 332-337).

Meanwhile, environmental issues are said to have been of actual concern for China, such as in the field of hazardous wastes and their disposal, as they have committed to the Basel Convention despite their incessant claims on sovereignty (Bradford 1997). Economy (2007) elaborates how environmental issues could ultimately lead to questions on the legitimacy of the government, as external costs will hinder development and increase protests. Furthermore, an article was issued in China regarding environmental investment in 2003 (Dan 2003), which all in all implies that China already had divergent interests with the Global South from the pre-rise period.

Has China emphasized the importance of development vis-à-vis the G77 members to cover up its increasingly divergent interests and its silent behavior over time? Being true to its interests does not hinder China from simultaneously emphasizing the importance of development. Aside from climate change politics, China, along with G77, supported the claim that desertification needs to be addressed in 2006 (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2006). Their logic hinged on three things; (i) doing so affects not only the survival but “development” of many countries, (ii) adequate technical/financial support is required, and (iii) China itself is domestically vulnerable with regards to desertification (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2006). China was able to fit both its interests and claims on development in this agenda to engage in the UNGA with G77.
On the other hand, climate change politics show a slightly different picture. A news article from 2009 explains how China went against the draft of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) that calls for strict emission reduction for developing countries due to the uncertainty of its effects on the Kyoto Protocol (Zhang and Duan 2009). Furthermore, the governmental article maintains an explicitly bland tone when it reports how the G77 has condemned the “rich countries” for their “carbon colonialism”, and summarizes the politics surrounding post-Kyoto Protocol ideas (Chen 2009). These cases allude to the fact that, at least with regard to climate change, China remained true to its interests rather than pandering on the G77 members, even on a rhetorical level.

Post-rise period cases imply that China succeeded in coming to terms with the G77 even in climate change issues. In 2009, Dai Bingguo addressed a speech on behalf of Hu Jintao, articulating that (i) it is not realistic nor fair for the developing countries to shoulder the same burden on emission reductions, (ii) material development is the basis on which climate change can be addressed, and that (iii) “G77 and China” calls for a technological transfer mechanism, while (iv) China is tackling these issues as the largest developing country (Wu et al. 2009).

7.3 Empirical Analysis for Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 mentioned that, regardless of China’s rise, China will not emphasize their position on security issues, and quietly pursue their interests.

Although the former half of the hypothesis trying to prove that China is not emphasizing their position sounds like a conundrum, several Chinese behaviors can be taken as signs that China is proactively avoiding standing out in the UNGA.

The First Committee is in charge of security issues, and Indonesia, on behalf of NAM, has drafted the resolution entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” in the 63rd session (A/C.1/63/L.26). The draft was eventually adopted by 141 votes to 4 with 34 abstentions, but China’s voting records do not appear on the verbatim record, indicating their “absence” (A/63/PV.61; A/RES/63/54). Furthermore, the report from the First Committee reveals that China did not participate in the voting when the Committee adopted the draft resolution before sending it to the plenary (A/63/389, draft res.XIV: 14-15). It is fair to say that these “absent” cases are intentional absence, not only because of its thoroughness from the Committee to the plenary, but also because adjacent voting records on other drafts, either in the Committee or in the plenary.
(A/63/389: 13-16; A/63/PV.61: 13-15), include records of China and indicate its actual presence. Unlike small countries, they should have enough delegation members to cover these reaction opportunities.

Since these are cases of China trying not to stand out, its real intentions and relevant interests are difficult to uncover from speeches or texts. However, being absent in front of a draft that was sponsored by NAM as the group of developing states, and even avoiding “abstention” by being “absent” hints at the fact that China does not want to expose its opinions on the matter.

In order to look for potential continuity of such behavior, I conducted a thorough survey of such behavior during the 63rd to 65th sessions (from 2008 to 2011) on the draft and verbatim records related to the 831 resolutions, which reveals that only four drafts, among which two are different versions of the other, saw “absent” cases of China upon their adoption (A/C.1/63/L.26; A/C.1/63/L.32; A/C.1/63/L.32/Rev.1; A/C.1/65/L.19).

All drafts belong to the First Committee, and the other example from the 63rd session (2008) is about “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments”, co-sponsored by a mixture of individual states that include G77 members as well as both the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/63/L.32; A/C.1/63/L.32/Rev.1). The other draft from the 65th session (2010) is drafted by NAM, and is entitled “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium” (A/C.1/65/L.19).

Finally, this tendency of China from the interim to post-rise era seems to have a connection to a statement made in the pre-rise era of 2004. Wang Yi, the then-Vice Foreign Minister addressed a speech at the 14th Foreign Ministers Conference of NAM, saying that they should maintain the leading role of the UN and the UNSC, and that issues on world peace and security, and especially those on “war and peace”, should be decided at the UNSC (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in Turkey 2004). China can avoid appearing as a self-contradictory state that talks for the developing countries while pushing for security issues towards the opposite direction by diverting the discussion to the UNSC with less developing countries.

The latter half of the hypothesis was tested by the UNGA Co-Sponsorship dataset. Topic on security was teased out by filtering out “Topic 5” from Finke (2020; 2021)’s definition, and I ran regressions on whether having more G77 members in the co-sponsorship cohort made any changes to the possibility of China joining sponsorship on the
draft. Model 9, 10 and 11 respectively did the same on the “pre-rise” (1993-2005), “interim” (2006-2008), and “post-rise” (2009-2016) periods, and Model 12 shows the overall trend. Several control variables were used, which are the same with Table 4.

If the latter half of Hypothesis 3 holds true, China should continue to see an unchanging degree of “negative” effect of G77 author ratio on the possibility of Chinese authorship. Models 9, 10, and 11 show that G77 author ratio does decrease the likelihood of Chinese authorship, although the negative effect seems to be strengthening rather than remaining the same. This may be due to the fact that China is increasing its military power, which distances the G77 members even further. Finally, it is interesting to see how the positive effect of authoritarian ratio strengthens over time.

Table 5: Results of Regressions in Models 9~12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>-50.38 *</td>
<td>533.51</td>
<td>-642.89</td>
<td>-4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(20.21)</td>
<td>(537.90)</td>
<td>(500.25)</td>
<td>(5.96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g77_author_ratio</td>
<td>-1.03 ***</td>
<td>-3.10 ***</td>
<td>-3.11 ***</td>
<td>-1.76 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taiwan_author_ratio</td>
<td>-1.82 ***</td>
<td>4.76 *</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(1.91)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian_ratio</td>
<td>4.13 ***</td>
<td>7.09 ***</td>
<td>7.84 ***</td>
<td>5.31 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chinaGDP</td>
<td>-0.00 **</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>0.03 *</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R^2          | 0.19    | 0.22    | 0.17    | 0.18    |
Adj. R^2     | 0.19    | 0.21    | 0.17    | 0.18    |
Num. obs.    | 2050   | 438     | 1109    | 3597    |
7.4 Empirical Analysis for Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 was an aggregate hypothesis that China will emphasize heir alignment with the Global South in contrast to their silent behavior that increasingly aligns with the Global North. The former half of the hypothesis requires some descriptive analysis in addition to the reflections on Table 3 initially presented for Hypothesis 1.

If the former half of Hypothesis 4 held true, China’s aggregate behavior on the emphasis on topics that are in affinity with the position of the Global South should increase when comparing the interim and post-rise eras, and lead to a larger ratio of G77 authors or more group co-sponsorship cases with “G77 and China”. Two traditional topics on the respect of sovereignty and development are close to the ideas in “sovereignty”, “development” and “order” of the text analysis data, and “governance of the international organizations”, where the G77 can call for an “unbiased” international organization. On the contrary, topics on “transnationalism”, “governance of domestic issues” and “humanitarian/human rights” relate to the opposite ideas of the respect for sovereignty.

To reiterate the results from Table 3, the cases of certain variables giving effects to both G77 ratio and group co-sponsorship possibility as “G77 and China” (as in Model 2 and 4) increased in the post-rise eras compared to the interim periods (respectively in Model 1 and 3).

However, the types of effects were not in the anticipated direction for all cases, and one variable (“humanitarian/human rights”) out of the two effective topics (“humanitarian/human rights” and “order”) in Model 2 had opposite effects to the guess. However, talking about the betterment of individuals are often coupled with debates on preserving order, and may not be as counterintuitive.

As to Model 4, two variables (“governance of the international organizations” and “order”) had contradictory effects to the guess out of the four effective topics (“transnationalism”, “governance of domestic issues”, “governance of the international organizations” and “order”). These two cases require further exploration, but it may be getting more difficult for the developing countries to converge on value-ridden ideals about international organizations, as it is no longer about abstract anti-hegemonic spirits, but concrete ideas on how to achieve efficiency or transparency. In line with this, “order” also
may be no longer appealing for developing countries if they feel that China is overly prioritizing order over justice. In sum, China’s emphasis on topics became more “effective” in post-rise eras, but includes cases that run in the opposite way from China’s intentions.

It is also worth reiterating that China has not given up on trying to anchor G77 support, and has rather increased its willingness to do so. Comparing Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing’s statements in the G77 Ministerial Meetings of different times periods reveal an interesting fact. In 2005, which is the pre-rise period, Li stipulated that (i) strengthening cooperation and (ii) pushing for development were important, and (i) included “strengthening of policy consultations and coordination and creating common strategies on important issues to enhance their right to participate and the power to influence within international administration” along with “reform of the UN” (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Argentina 2005).

However, during the interim period in 2007, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing attended the 30th Ministerial Meeting of G77 to acknowledge the seriousness of the North-South divide, and to propose three points, where the “strengthening of cooperation [between the G77 and China]” comes before “development” and “the promotion of reform in the UN Development System”, and is explained that “it is necessary to fully leverage the traditional dominance of the G77, to take common positions on major international issues, and to enhance the right to participate, voice, and influence” (Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN 2007).

It is obvious that China separated policy coordination that presumably includes UNGA coalition relations from the issue of UN reform, and they added the “right to voice” to the rights to “participate” and “influence”. Such changes speak for themselves that China does not take coalition with the G77 as something for granted, despite the long tradition of cooperation. Rather, they are keen on preserving the relationship as they rise.

As to the latter half of the hypothesis, I ran regressions regarding all observations of the data without any topic conditions with the UNGA co-sponsorship dataset. According to the hypothesis, the positive effect of G77 author ratio on the silent behavior of Chinese sponsorship should lessen as time goes by, in the order of Model 13, 14 and 16. Again, Model 16 represents the overall trend. The end result paralleled earlier regression models on silent behavior, where the effect of G77 author ratio was negative even at the “pre-rise” phase, and that its negative effect strengthened as time went by.
Albeit not the main theme of this paper, this is in stark contrast to the fact that China is increasingly likely to co-sponsor with authoritarian regimes over time. Finally, a puzzling case is seen in Model 15 and 16 that China is more likely to sponsor with Taiwan recognizers, but this may be because such states are increasingly small states, and China has other reasons to co-sponsor with them.

Table 6: Results of Regressions in Models 13~16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Pre</td>
<td>Interim</td>
<td>Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent Variable</td>
<td>ChinaAuthor</td>
<td>ChinaAuthor</td>
<td>ChinaAuthor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>-43.54 *</td>
<td>18.25</td>
<td>-134.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g77_author_ratio</td>
<td>-1.66 ***</td>
<td>-3.24 ***</td>
<td>-6.03 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taiwan_author_ratio</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>6.94 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian_ratio</td>
<td>3.87 ***</td>
<td>5.88 ***</td>
<td>9.90 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chinaGDP</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>year</td>
<td>0.02 *</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R^2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>4993</td>
<td>1316</td>
<td>4040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05

8. Conclusion
Table 7 summarizes the findings for each hypothesis. Hypothesis 4, which is the most essential question on the aggregate behavior of China, reveals that (1) China’s emphasis on topics became more “effective” in post-rise eras, but this included cases that run in the opposite way from China’s intentions in appealing to the Global South. Meanwhile, China’s intentions to anchor G77 support have strengthened from the pre-rise to interim era. As to its silent behavior, (2) pre-rise cases already saw negative effects of G77 author ratio on Chinese authorship, indicating that China’s silent behavior was aligned with the Global North from the pre-rise era. Such negative effects strengthened over time.

To paraphrase, overall, China’s silent behavior was increasingly aligned with the Global North (and it was less but already aligned with the Global North in its pre-rise era), but its emphasis on ideas intended to anchor G77 support did not function the way they intended.

This aggregate result can be dissected by the underlying Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. As to silent behavior, Hypotheses 2 and 3 respectively on environmental and security issues had the same answer; pre-rise cases already saw negative effects of G77 author ratio on Chinese authorship, indicating that China’s silent behavior was aligned with the Global North, albeit to a lesser extent when compared to the post-rise era. With these findings, it is intuitive that the aggregate result shows the same tendency.

As to the rhetorical behavior, the picture becomes a little blurry. As Hypothesis 1 and 4 verify, China increased its intention to appeal to G77 members by emphasizing ideas on respect for sovereignty and development, although some other ideas contrary to the respect for sovereignty were also emphasized. The effects of ideas that should be conducive to G77 support sometimes showed opposite effects as well as vice versa, though ideas on “development” operated as expected.

To dissect such emphasis behavior with Hypothesis 2, China effectively combined ideas on “development” to its sheer interests to come to terms with the G77 on environmental issues, where their interests diverged from the pre-rise era. As to Hypothesis 3, China chooses “absence” over “abstain” when voting on security issues that they could appear as self-contradictory in the eyes of developing countries, and seeks to divert the problem to the UNSC with less developing countries. While it is necessary to expand the text analysis data to systematically explore China’s rhetorical behavior by environmental and security topics, they hint at how China cares about their appeal to the G77.
Table 7: Summary of the Answers to the Hypotheses of This Paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Even after China’s rise, China’s emphasis on the respect for sovereignty and development should not decrease. China’s cases of emphasis increase not only on the respect for sovereignty and development, but also ideas contrary to the respect of sovereignty. While some ideas on the respect of sovereignty and development boosted G77 author ratio or group co-sponsorship as “G77 and China” and vice versa, some had opposite effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Along with China’s rise, they should increasingly behave in line with the Global North on environmental issues, while still emphasizing the importance of development. (1) Pre-rise cases already saw negative effects of G77 author ratio on Chinese authorship, indicating that China’s silent behavior was aligned with that of the Global North from the pre-rise era, albeit to a lesser extent when compared to the post-rise era. (2) As China and G77 had divergent interests from the pre-rise era, China coupled developmental rhetoric with their frank articulation of their interests, which sometimes led to clashes but eventually to G77-China coalition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Regardless of China’s rise, China will not emphasize their position in security issues, and quietly pursue their interests. (1) China chooses “absence” over “abstain” when voting on issues they could appear as self-contradictory in the eyes of developing countries, and seeks to divert the problem to the UNSC rather than the UNGA with more developing countries. (2) Pre-rise cases already saw negative effects of G77 author ratio on Chinese authorship, indicating that China’s silent behavior was aligned with that of the Global North from the pre-rise era. Such negative effects strengthened rather than remain the same over time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>Along with China’s rise, China will emphasize their alignment with the Global South in contrast to their silent behavior that increasingly aligns with the Global North. (1) China’s emphasis on topics became more “effective” in post-rise eras, but</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
this includes cases that run in the opposite way from China’s intentions in appealing to the Global South. Meanwhile, China’s intentions to anchor G77 support have strengthened from the pre-rise to interim era.

(2) Pre-rise cases already saw negative effects of G77 author ratio on Chinese authorship, indicating that China’s silent behavior was aligned with that of the Global North from the pre-rise era. Such negative effects strengthened over time.

(Overall) China emphasized ideas intended to anchor G77 support (Global South support), which did not function the way they intended. Meanwhile, China’s silent behavior was increasingly aligned with that of the Global North.

The first takeaway from this paper is that China cares about the G77 in the UNGA as a coalition counterpart that can garner support when in need. At the same time, they were well aware that coalitions may collapse when circumstances change, and have been reassuring their solidarity in multiple speeches before its rise.

As their rise actually happened, China’s silent behavior and emphasis on ideas diverged as to whether they were oriented towards the Global North or the Global South. Their silent behavior became increasingly far from G77 and oriented towards the Global North, regardless of the issue area, while they expressed stronger needs of ideas to align with the G77, or the Global South. The farther they behaved from the G77, they had to make more efforts to anchor G77 as a coalition that can secure a large number of supporters for China.

Meanwhile, when it comes to the concrete contents of the emphasized ideas, not all were those allegedly conducive to gaining G77 support, which are ideas on the respect of sovereignty and development. In other words, China made statements on ideas that ran counter to the respect of sovereignty, such as ideas that make recommendations on “governance of domestic issues”. Furthermore, ideas relevant to the respect of sovereignty had both positive and negative effects in garnering G77 support. Meanwhile, the ideas on development showed positive effects as expected.

There are several areas for further exploration. Firstly, although this paper presented legitimate reasons to focus on G77, China’s relation to other group co-sponsors, especially NAM as another group of developing countries, and its relation to G77, needs to
be explored. As alluded to throughout the paper, China is somewhat distanced from NAM compared to its affinity with G77.

Secondly, alternative theories may be explored and tested in explaining China’s combination of silent behavior and emphasis of ideas. If vote buying of rising powers work as that of the United States (Carter and Stone 2015), why then, does China earnestly emphasize their solidarity with the G77? Thirdly, customs unique to the UNGA may lessen the degree to which China makes sponsorship decisions from scratch. For example, an “annual” resolution that condemns the United States on its embargo against Cuba is always sponsored solely by Cuba but ardently supported by the G77 and China via statements and upon adoption (A/64/L.4; A/64/PV.27). It is desirable to see the extent to which the customs of such sponsorship patterns change the overall trend. Finally, the effects of emphasis on specific ideas require the expansion of the text analysis data and its further analyses, especially regarding when China and G77 agree or disagree regarding sovereignty-related ideas.

Despite these limitations, the stark contrast between China’s silent behavior that moves away from G77 and emphasis on ideas that are increasingly intended to anchor G77 highlights the paradox of rising in the UNGA.

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Professor Daniel Finke (Aarhus University) and the International Interactions Journal Community for providing me with the information on article citation and data location. I deeply appreciate Dr. Rafael Mesquita (Federal University of Pernambuco) for his rich advice on data collection regarding UNGA co-sponsorship, and Professor Carla Monteleone (University of Palermo) for suggestions on data for coalition politics. I also thank Professor Shin Kawashima (University of Tokyo), Professor Atsushi Ishida (University of Tokyo) and Dr. Yumi Nishimura (University of Tokyo) for their constant guidance over my doctoral dissertation.

I am also very grateful to everyone who engaged with this project at the 2021 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting (Panel “Legislative Politics of the United Nations”), and especially to Professor Erik Voeten (Georgetown University), Evan Jones (University of Maryland) and Yuan Zhou (Kobe University) for their rich advice. Their advice will be integrated in the future versions of this project/draft.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408
Tomoko Takahashi

**Funding**
This work was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Fellows Grant Number JP21J13964. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the author’s organization, JSPS or Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology-Japan (MEXT).

**References**
1. **Articles/Book**

1.1 **English (Order in Alphabet)**


Moore, Thomas G. 2008. “Racing to integrate, or cooperating to compete? -Liberal and realist interpretations of China’s new multilateralism-”. In Wu, Guoguang and


### 1.2 Chinese (Order in Pinyin)


### 1.3 Japanese (Order in Roman Alphabet)


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408
Tomoko Takahashi

no Taigai Senryaku". Kokusai Seiji 183: 116-130.)(青山瑞妙「台頭を目指す中国の対外戦略」『国際政治』183号、116-130頁。)


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408


2. Documents

2.1 English (Order in Alphabet)

Charter of the United Nations.


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408


2.2 Chinese (Order in Pinyin)


3  Websites
3.1 English (Order in Alphabet)

3.2 Chinese (Order in Alphabet of Translated Names)
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Argentina. 2005. “Statement by Minister Li Zhaoxing at the 29th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77” [in Chinese,


2021a. “Qishiqi Jituan”.) （中华人民共和国外交部（2021年a）≪七十七国集团≫。）


Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the UN (Website). Last visited on September 15, 2021 at: http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/chn/。（Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chang Zhu Lianheguo Daibiao Tuan.）


Qishi Qi Guo jitung di Sanshi jie Waizhang Huiyi shang de Fayan”.)(中华人民共和国常驻联合国代表团(2007 年)「李肇星外长在 77 国集团第 30 届外长会议上的发言」。


(Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi. 2010. “Zhongguo Dui Fazhanzhong Guojia Heping Waijiao Liushinian”)(国务院新闻办公室（2010 年）《中国对发展中国家和平外交六十年》。

4. Data

4.1 Finke (2020)’s Data on UNGA Co-Sponsorship

Finke, Daniel, 2020, "Replication Data for: Regime Type and Co-Sponsorship in the UN General Assembly", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/126RIL, Harvard Dataverse, V1; rawdata_assembly.dta [fileName]. In Finke, Daniel, 2020, "Replication Data for: Regime Type and Co-Sponsorship in the UN General Assembly", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/126RIL, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:x+nKdz1RF6H3xWQhQ0oFzA== [fileUNF].


4.2 Mesquita and Seabra (2020)’s Data on UNGA Co-Sponsorship

Mesquita, Rafael; Seabra, Pedro, 2020."Annex Politikon Article - Go global or go home.pdf", Replication Data for "Go global or go home: Comparing the regional vs. global engagement of Brazil and South Africa at the UN General Assembly", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NQ9VTT/8Y6KBV, Harvard Dataverse, V1. In Mesquita, Rafael; Seabra, Pedro, 2020, "Replication Data for "Go global or go home: Comparing the regional vs. global engagement of Brazil and South Africa at the UN General Assembly"", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NQ9VTT, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:EO+oYkbZkbeVuFZV1U752A== [fileUNF].


Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3944408